



I 1° /' 
R T "'i 
J A. .  ClAP. 4 
BOARD OF TRADE 
CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 
Report on the Accident to 
Boeing 707-465 G-AR WE 
at Heathrow Airport, London 
on 8th April 1968 
LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 
Price 8s. 6d. net 
BOARD OF TRADE 
CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 
Report on the Accident to 
Boeing 707-465 G-ARWE 
at Heathrow Airport. London 
on 8th April 1968 
LONOON :  HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OF ICE 
1969 
BOARD OF TRADE 
Accidents Investigation Branch 




The Rt . HonourabZe Anthony CrosZand �w 
President of the Board of Trade 
Sir, 
I have the honour to submit the report on the circumstances 
of the accident to the Boeing 707-465 G-ARlI'E which occurred at 
HeathrOlv Airport, London on 8th April 1968. 
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ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANO; 
Civil Accident Report No. E\'1/C/0203 
Boeing 707-465 G-ARWE 
Four Rolls Royce Conway 508 
British Overseas Airways Corporation 
ColTllMJlder - Captain C R W Taylor uninjured 
Co-Pilot - Senior First Officer 
J B Kirkland uninjured 
Second Officer - Acting First Officer 
J C Hutchinson uninjured 
Flight Engineer - Engineer Officer 
T C Hicks uninjured 
Oleck Captain - Captain G S Moss uninjured 
Senior Steward - Mr N Davis Gordon uninjured 
Steward - Mr A �1cCarthy uninjured 
Ste\Vard - Mr B Tay10r uninjured 
Stewardess - Miss R Unwin uninjured 
Stewardess - Hiss J Suares uninjured 
Stewardess - Miss B Harrison killed 
116 4 killed 
38 injured 
Heathrow Airport, London 
8th April 1968 at 1530 hrs. 
All times in this report are QlIT 
Summary 
ApproximateLy one minute after take-off from Runway 28 Left, No. 2  
engine faiLed and a few seconds Later caught fire . The crew, 
having star.ed an Engine FaiLure DriL L  had to change directLy to 
an Engine Fire DriL L .  However, the fire did not go out and the 
aircraft was manoeuvred for the quickest possibLe return to Land 
on Runway as Right. During the approach, No . 2  engine feL L  away 
from the aircraft . 
The aircraft made a good Landing on Runway as Right and when it 
came to a stop, the fire, which had continued to burn near the 
No. 2 engine position, increased in intensity and the fueL tanks 
in the port wing expLoded. 
Emergency evacuation was started as soon as the aircraft came to 
a stop but four of the passengers and one stewardess were overcome 
by heat and smoke and did not escape. 
The investigation into the accident estabLished that the engine 
suffered a fatigue faiLure of its fifth stage Low pressure com­
pressor wheeL and that parts of the broken wheeL had burst through 
the compressor casing. The engine fueL suppLy Line was severed and 
the escaping fUeL then ignited. The fire continued to burn 
because of an omission to cLose the fueL shut-off vaLve by puLLing 
the fire shut-off handLe when the Engine Fire DriLL was carried 
out. 
The investigation has aLso shown that the overaLL efficiency of 
the airport fire services was seriousLy reduced by poor depLoy­
ment of some appLiances and by equipment faiLures. 
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1. Investigation 
1.1 History of the flight 
The aircraft was operating Flight BA.712 from Heathrow Airport, 
London to Zurich with onward routing to Sydney Australia. In 
addition to the normal crel, complement, a supe;"isory captain was 
on the aircraft for the purpose of carrying out a route check on 
Captain Taylor. The aircraft became airborne from Runway 28 Left 
at 1527 hrs. and 20 seconds later, just before the time for the 
noise abatement power reduction, the flight crew felt and heard 
a combined shock and bang. The thrust lever for No. 2 engine 
"kicked" towards the closed position and at the same time the 
instruments showed that the engine was running dm>Tl. TI,e Captain 
ordered "Engine Failure Drill" and the Flight Engineer began the 
immediate actions of that drill. Because the undercarriage was 
retracted, the warning horn sounded when the Flight Engineer fully 
retarded the thrust lever; the Check Captain and Flight Engineer 
simultaneously went for and pulled the horn cancel switch on the 
pedestal whilst the First Officer, instinctively, but in error, 
pressed the fire bell cancel button in front of him. The Flight 
Engineer went for the engine fire shut-off handle but he did not 
pull it. 
The lack of a flight deck voice recorder makes it impossible to 
establish a second by second timing of events, but at about this 
time the Check Captain looked out of a flight deck window on the 
port side and reported a serious fire in No.2 engine, adding words 
to the effect that a landing should be made at the earliest 
possible moment. 
No member of the flight crew recalls hearing the fire warning bell. 
Nevertheless, the fire warning light in No.2 fire shut-off handle 
was seen to be on and the Captain ordered an "Engine Fire Drill". 
The Check Captain <uggested, and the First Officer with the 
Captain's approval broadcast, a "Mayday" call. 
Having initially started an Engine Failure Drill, the Flight 
Engineer changed directly to the Engine Fire Drill. According to 
his evidence, having completed Phase 1 of the Engine Fire Drill, 
which is required to be done by memory, he subsequently used his 
own copy of the check list to complete Phase 11 of the drill, 
including the operation of the fire extinguisher transfer switch 
and pushing the discharge button for the second shot thirty 
seconds after the first. When the First Officer started to read 
the check list the Flight Engineer told him the check was already 
completed. During this period and subsequently, according to his 
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evidence, the Check Captain directed his attention to monitoring 
the state of the fire on the Iving and to providing the Captain 
IVith cOl1ll\ents intended to help him position the aircraft for the 
landing. 
ATC originally offered the Captain a landing back on Runway 28 
Left and alerted the fire services but after the ''tlayday'' call he 
IVas offered RunIVay OS Right Imich was accepted as it "'Quld resul t 
in a shorter flight path. ATC ordered other landing aircraft to 
overshoot in order to ensure a clear approach to RunIVay OS Right 
and to clear Runway 28 Right for the passage of the fire vehicles. 
The initial notification to the Airport Emergency Services of the 
expected landing on Runway 28 Left was also revised. 
About 11 minutes after the start of the fire, No.2 engine, together 
with part of its pylon, became detached and fell into a water­
filled gravel pit. This IVas unknown to the flight crew but because 
of the separation the light in the fire handle would have gone out. 
Nevertheless, they were aIVare that a serious fire continued to burn. 
At various places along the flight path a number of engine fragments 
and pieces of cOIVling had already fallen away, but these caused no 
injury to persons or damage to property. 
At about the time the engine fell away the undercarriage was 
10lvered and full flap selected. The undercarriage locked down 
nonnally but the hydraulic pressure and contents were seen to fall 
and the flaps stopped extending at 470, that is 30 short of their 
full range. 
The approach to RunIVay OS Right was made from a difficult 
position, the aircraft being close to the runIVay and having reached 
a heiWlt of about 3,000 feet and a speed of 225 knots. There is no 
glide slope guidance to tllis runIVay but the approach was well 
judged and touchdown was achieved approximately 400 yards beyond 
the threshold. To add to the Captain's difficulties, during the 
final approach the Flight Engineer informed him that the instru­
ments of No.l engine indicated that it miWlt fail, although it did 
not do so. 
I n  order to bring the aircraft to a stop in the shortest possible 
distance after landing, in addition to the wheel brakes, reverse 
thrust from No.l and No.4 engines was used down to a very low 
speed. The use of reverse thrust caused the flames to be deflected 
in towards the fuselage. The aircraft came to a stop just to the 
left of the runway centre-line, about 1,800 yards from the threshold, 
on a heading of 035Dr-1. 
After the aircraft came to rest the Flight Engineer cOll1T\CJl.ced the 
Engine Shut-Down Drill and closed the start levers. Al.Jrost 
simultaneously the Captain ordered fire drill on the remaining 
engines. Before this could be carried out there was an explosion 
from the port wing IVhich increased the intensity o� the fire and 
blew fragments of the wing over t� the.
starboard s1de of the a1r­
craft. The Captain then ordered :unmed1ate evacuatlOn of the fl1ght 
deck. TIle engine fire shut-off handles were not pulled �d the 
fuel booster pumps and main electrical supply were not sw1tched 
off. TIlere were more explosions and fuel, which was released from 
the port tanks, spread underneath the aircraft and greatly enlarged 
the area of the fire. 
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The cabin crew had made preparations for an emergency landing and 
as the aircraft came to a stop opened the emergency exits and 
started rigging the escape chutes. The passengers commenced 
evacuation from the tl<O starboard overwing exits and shortly 
aften;ards, when the escape chutes had been inflated, from the 
rear starboard galley door and then the forward starboard galley 
door. I lowever , because of the spread of the fire under the rear 
of the fuselage the escape chute at the rear galley door soon 
burst and, following the first explosion, the overwing escape route 
also became unusable. The great majority of the survivors left the 
aircraft via the forward galley door escape chute. 
The First Officer, who could not get into the galley to help with 
the evacuation, left the aircraft through the starboard flight 
deck window by use of the escape rope at that position. The 
Second Officer, l;ho helped guide the passengers in the initial 
stages, followed. TIle Captain, having assisted the stewardess to 
inflate the port forward chute, also left by the flight deck 
window after seeing the evacuation was proceeding satisfactorily. 
The Flight Engineer sal; that the port forward chute had not inflated 
properly so he climbed down it to straighten it. However, 
immediately after it inflated it became unusable from heat and burst. 
The evacuation of passengers had been largely completed by the time 
the Airport Fire and Rescue Services began to provide assistance. 
The fire services prevented the fuel in the starboard tanks from 
catching fire but the rear fuselage and port wing were burned out. 
Four of the passengers and one stewardess were overcome by heat 
and smoke at the rear of the aircraft and did not escape, whilst 
thirty-eight passengers sustained injuries during the evacuation. 
Some hours after the accident it was not known how many had 
escaped alive or had been injured because some survivors I<ere 
quickly removed to various treatment and rest centres whilst 
others left the vicinity of the airport without leaving their names. 





1.3 Damage to aircraft 
TIle aircraft was destroyed. 








1. 5 Crew information 
Captain CharZes Wi Zson RatcZiffe TayZor, aged 4 7 ,  held an airline 
transport pilot's licence , endorsed for command of Boeing 707 
aircraft . His last competency check was on 6th September 1967 and 
his last medical examination was on 20th October 1967 . At the time 
of the accident his total flying experience was 14 , 878 hours , of 
lruch 1 , 555 were on Boeing 707 aircraft . He had flown SO hours 
during the 30 days preceding the accident and had been free of 
duty for 18 days prior to the commencement of this fl ight . 
Senior First Officer Francis Brendan KirkZand, aged 32, held an 
airline transport pilot's licence , endorsed for command of Boeing 
707 aircraft . His last competency check was on 4th August 1967 
and his last medical examination was on 18th January 1968 . At the 
time of the accident his total flying experience was 5 ,496 hours 
of which 2 , 829 were on Boeing 707 aircraft . He had flown 11 hours 
in 30 days preceding the accident and had been free of duty for 
9 days prior to the commencement of this fl ight . 
Acting First Officer John Chester Butchinson, aged 30, held an 
airline transport pilot ' s  licence , endorsed for command of Hoeing 
707 aircraft . His last competency check was on 6th March 1968 and 
his last medical examination was on 4th December 196 7 .  At the 
t ime of the accident his total flying experience was 4 , 120 hours 
of Idlich 680 were on Boeing 707 aircraft . He had flOlm 5 hours 
during the 30 days preceding the accident and had been free of duty 
for 13 days prior to the commencement of this flight . 
Engineer Officer Thomas CharZes Hicks, aged 35 , held a fl ight 
engineer's licence , endorsed for Boeing 707 aircraft . His last 
competency check was on 27th December 1967 and his last medical 
examination was on 4th December 1967 . At the time of the accident 
his total flying experience was 6 ,436 hours of which 191 were on 
Boeing 707 aircraft . He had £101,n 52 hours during the 30 days 
preceding the accident and had been free of duty for 22  days prior 
to the commencement of this flight . 
Supervisory Captain Geoffrey Sydney Moss, aged SO, held an airline 
transport pilot's licence , endorsed for command of Boeing 707 
aircraft . His last competency check was on 6th November 1967 and 
his last medical examination was on 6th December 1967 . At the 
time of the accident his total flying experience was 12 , 957 hours 
of which 3 , 185 were on Boeing 707 aircraft . He had flOl,n 56 hours 
during the 30 days preceding the accident �d �d been free. of duty 
for 9 days prior to the commencement of th1s fl1ght . Capta1n Moss 
I13S been a supervisory captain on 707 aircraft since 1963 . 
All members of the flight crew and the cabin crew had received 
emergency procedure training within the prescribed period . 
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1.6 Aircraft information 
(a) General 
G-ARWE Has built in 1962 and Hent into service with BOAC the same 
year. It had been regularly serviced in accordance with an 
approved maintenance schedule. At the time of the accident it had 
flOlvn a total of 20,870 hours. 
On the 21st November 1967 it was involved in an accident at 
Honolulu, when a turbine in No.4 engine failed during the take­
off run: flying debris punctured a fuel tank and released fuel 
Hhich ignited and the take-off Has abandoned. The fire Has 
subsequently extinguished by the airport fire services. The 
aircraft ';as repaired and all the engines Here changed. 
(b) No. 2  engine 
This engine Has constructed in 1961 and the records show that it 
was completely overhauled in March 1965. In May 1965 it Has 
removed from service because of reported vibration. Investigation 
revealed a Stage 8 high pressure awl compressor blade failure due 
to fatigue. The engine was repaired and returned to service. In 
October 1967 the engine Has removed because of flame tube 
deterioration and forwarded to the BOAC engine overhaul base for 
repair. During this repair, in which the engine Has only partially 
stripped, the awl compressor Has not disturbed but the 10H pressure 
(Lp lcompressor, of Hhich the No. 5 Hheel was an original component, 
was completely stripped and overhauled. No crack detection 
procedure Has required or carried out during this repair. After 
the repair the engine Has bench tested on 22nd November 1967. 
During this test, after several runs and vibration surveys, the 
engine Has rejected for excessive vibration at the No.3 pick-up 
close to the HP compressor. The location of this pick-up 
position and these particular vibration limits Here instituted by 
BOAC as aids to maintenance and Here additional to those laid dOHn 
in the overhaul schedule by the engine manufacturer. The 
manufacturers limits were not exceeded at any time. After consider­
ing the record of the tests a company concession Has issued and 
the engine accepted. It Has installed in another Boeing 707 and 
after running 1,415 hours it was removed for a modification 
concerning the turbine seals. On 5th April 1968 it was installed 
in the No.2 position in G-ARlVE . 
At �le time of the accident this engine had run a total of 14,917 
hours since neH, including 4,346 hours since its last complete 
overhaul, and 1,416 hours since its last repair in 1967. The 
ConHaY series 508 normally has a period of 5,500 hours running 
time between complete overhauls. 
(a) Airaraft fuel  system 
TIle aircraft fuel tanks are an integral part of the wing structure 
with the front wing spar forming the fon;ard face of each fuel 
tank. Just behind the front spar and just inboard of the centre­
line of each engine pylon, is a fuel-free area knOHn as the dry bay, 
housing the electrically operated fuel shut-off valve. The shut-off 
7 
valve can be operated either by an individual gated switch on the 
flight engineer : s fuel panel on the flight deck or hy the appro­
pr1ate eng1J1e f1re shut-off handle on the glare shield between the 
two pilots. All fuel to an engine must pass through the shut-off 
valve in the dry bay and thence through the front spar and down the 
centreline of the pylon. The fuel is fed dml'Tl through a II inch 
steel pipeline �side the pylon fairing to a high pressure backing 
pump and to a h1gh pressure fuel valve on the engine; this high 
pressure valve is operated mecl1aJ1ically by the engine start lever 
on the flight deck pedestal. 
I�en the fuel shut-off valve in a dry bay is closed, there can be 
no fuel supply to the appropriate engine regardless of the 
settings of any otiler switch or fuel valve, except for such fuel 
already contained in the length of the li inch pipe from the shut­
off valve dml'Tl to the engine itself. It is estimated that this 
would not be sufficient to sustain an in-flight fire for more 
tl1aJ1 a fc'" seconds after closure of the shut-off valve. 
(d) Engine fire extinguisher system 
In this aircraft, means are provided for smothering an engine fire 
by flooding the engine cowling space with an inert gas. The 
system for each engine is controlled through its fire shut-off 
handle and appropriate switches, located on the pilot's glare 
shield. 
In the event of an engine fire a red warning light "ill illuminate 
in the appropriate fire shut-off handle and the fire warning bell 
will ring. Pulling the fire shut-off handle "ill cause a number 




To arm electrically the fire extinguisher discharge switch. 
To cause the fuel shut-off valve in the dry bay to close 
electrically within one second and, at the same time (in 
the case of engines No.2 and 3) shut-off the supply of 
hydraulic oil to the engine driven hydraulic pumps. 
To trip the generator control relay after 5-10 seconds. 
TIle fire shut-off handle has a positive pull out : stay out 
action requiring a force of approximately 12 lb to operate or 
re-set. When pulled it protrudes about ! inch from the adjacent 
handles. Only after the fire shut-off handle has been pulled can 
fire extinguisher bottles be discharged. If the fire continues to 
bum despite the first discharge, the appropriate transfer slHtch 
should be moved to "transfer" "hen, by pressing the same fire 
extinguisher button again, the extinguishant from the bottles for 
the adjacent engine can be used. 
1.7 Meteorological information 
The only relevant "eather information is that for the ill,lIediate 
area of lIeathrow Airport, London. At the time of the accident 
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12 kilometres 




A special report made as 1531 hrs. following the accident, gave 
the surface WLnd as 160 3 knots; there was no other significant 
cJ1ange from the 1515 hrs. report. The stable weather conditions, 
particularly the good visibility and the light surface wind, 
pennitted the return approach and landing to be made without the 
complications of tail or crosswind or other weather factors. 
1.8 Aids to navigation 
The aircraft remained in visual contact Ln the immediate vicinity 
of the airport in good visibility. 
1.9 Communications 
After using various ground control frequencies for start-up and 
taxying, the aircraft changed to �IF frequency 118.2 �t/s before 
commencing the take-off and remained in good contact with the 
tower throughout the remainder of the accident flight. This 
frequency was in use for all landing and departing traffic at the 
time of the accident, but in view of the urgency of the situation 
and the limited time available the tower controller decided that 
it would be inadvisable to transfer either G-ARlVE or the other 
aircraft to an alternative frequency. Good R/T discipline was 
maintained throughout by all concerned and it is not considered 
that tlle other R/T traffic on this frequency in any way handicapped 
communication between G-ARlVE and the Tower. 
1.10 Aerodrome and ground facilities 
The airport fire fighting and rescue services, assisted by the 
London Fire Brigade, were heavily engaged in this accident and 
their participation has been examined in detail by a special 
group, whose report is attached at Annex 1. 
The salient points brought to light by this investigation are: 
(1) That the number of appliances, the amount of fire extinguish­
ing media and the staff available to the airport fire service 
were in excess of those required by the terms of the aero­
drome licence. 
(2) That appliances converged upon the crash scene from the two 
fire stations. 
9 
The first unit from the central area sub-station, arrived , 
. .  
at the aircraft within 30 seconds of 1ts comLng to rest; 
the remainder from the main station on the north side of 
Rlmway 28 Right arriving two minutes later, having been held 
up for about three-quarters of a minute before being able to 






time and ATC had to divert aircraft already on the approach. 
The hose-laying vehicle, which was on an airport familiarisa­
tion exercise in the central area arrived possibly as much as 
a minute later than it would have done had it been at the 
station. 
TIlat the London Fire Brigade were not alerted until four 
minutes after a warning of an impending accident had been 
given to the British Airports Authority fire service. Some 
twenty-two appliances arrived, the first about five minutes 
after the BAA main contingent. 
That the two foam appliances used in the initial attack were 
dral>TI up beyond the range of their cab-mounted monitor foam 
jets. Fire fighting therefore had to continue with hand 
lines only. Two hoses burst during the course of the 
operation, one three-quarters of a minute and another three­
and-a-half minutes after the first appliance started to make 
foam. 
TIlat there was some delay in getting the hydrant system 
connected to the thU fire-fighting appliances, so that after 
four and eight minutes respectively, having used up their 
mobile supplies, they ran out of water. At no time during 
the operation was more than a third of the total foam 
potential available at the scene in use and after three­
quarters of a minute the foam being applied was down to one­
quarter of that available from the first appliance, or one 
thousand gallons per minute. The Cardox C02 drenching 
equipment created a good knockdm<J1, but the gains were not 
consolidated with foam. 
TIlat the third foam tender, whose crel� had initially been 
designated for rescue purposes, was brought into action later 
and prevented the three thousand gallons of fuel in the star­
board tanks from catching fire. 
TIlat during the operation several attempts were made to enter 
the aircraft by firemen wearing breathing apparatus. These 
l�ere frustrated by heat and, in one case, by lack of water 
for the necessary protective spray. 
1.11 Flight recorder 
The aircraft was fitted with an Epsilon Flight Data Acquisition 
system, l�hich recorded, on a cOlTl'OOn time base, the following 
parameters: indicated airspeed, pressure altitude, magnet1c 
heading, pitch attitude and normal acceleration. I ts power supply 
is from the essential Radio Bus Bar which at the t1J1le of the 
accident l�as selected to No. 3 generator. 
TIle cassette containing the wire recording medium was removed intact 
frOM the tail unit of the aircraft after the accident. Except 
for a degree of smoke blackening it was found to be unaffected by 
fire and a "playback" of the flight record was undertaken without 
difficulty. 
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Recovery of data was carried out in both analogue and digital form 
and from the latter the path of the aircraft throughout the 
accident flight was plotted. It was established that the total 
time between rotation during the take-off and touch-down was 
3 minutes 32 seconds, the max imum height achieved was slightly less 
than 3,000 feet above airfield level and the maximum speed was 225 
knots. 
The heading trace indicated that the aircraft touched down on a 
heading of 050� and remained on that heading for a period of about 
25 seconds. In the following 8 seconds it turned on to a heading 
of approximately 035'1.1 and remained on that heading until the 
recording ceased 19 seconds later. 
1.12 Wreckage 
Inspection showed that the aircraft had been extensively damaged 
by fire. No.2 engine and most of its pylon was missing. Part of 
the structure of the port wing had melted causing it to break away 
from the fuselage and drop on to the runway. 
An examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed no 
evidence of damage to the wing other than that sustained from the 
fire. Inspection of the flight deck controls showed that all the 
fire shut-off handles were "IN" i. e. not activated. When examined 
during �1e investigation the absence of soot markings on their 
shafts indicated that they had been "IN" when the fire torched 
through the flight deck. The shut-off handles had not suffered 
damage1i other than scorching by the fire and when tes ted were 
found to be fully serviceable. 
The port fire extinguisher transfer switch was found set to 
"transfer" . The fuel booster pump switches for the main wing tanks 
were "ON" and the switches on the engineer's panel for the fuel 
shut -off valves were set to "OPEN". The shut -off valve switches are 
protected by a gate and DUst be pulled out and down for "OFF'. The 
normal tank to engine fuel supply was set up. No cross-feeding was 
taking place but No.l tank was selected to charge the manifold. 
The fuel contents and fuel flow gauge readings were considered to 
be unreliable because power was available to their respective 
electrical circuits when fire and explosion damage occurred to the 
port fuel tanks. 
The fuel and hydraUlic oil shut-off valves for the No.2 engine were 
located in the wreckage and found to be fully open. These valves 
are electrically operated through a motored gear train and their 
positions cannot alter due to fire or impact. They were tested 
and found to operate satisfactorily. 
No.2 engine was recovered from a water-filled gravel pit approxi­
mately 5 miles from the threshold of Runway 05 Right. It was 
substantially complete and only slightly damaged by fire. A short 
section of the rim of its No.5 stage LP compressor wheel was found 
nearby. 
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An intensive search was made of the ground covered by the aircraft's 
flight path. Just inside the airfield perimeter and close to the 
up-wind end of Runway 28 Left some severely damaged engine stator 
and rotor blades from the LP compressor were found together with 
fragments of the LP compressor casing. In this area also was the 
starboard section of the No.2 engine cowling which had been 
penetrated by flying debris and torn from its fittings. Further 
along the flight path portions of the No.S LP compressor wheel rim 
were found and also the main fuel feed pipe for the engine. This 
pipe is routed round the starboard side of the engine; examination 
showed that it had been displaced by the bursting of the LP 
compressor wheel rim and engine casing. 
TIle No.2 engine and associated components, and the main wreckage 
of the aircraft, were removed for detailed examination. 
(1) No.2 Engine failure 
It was clear that a major mechanical failure had occurred in this 
engine and a detailed examination and metallurgical study was made 
in collaboration with the manufacturer. Strip inspection revealed 
that No.S LP compressor wheel had disintegrated, throwing several 
pieces of its rim and blading through the casing. It was this 
major damage to the casing which displaced the main fuel pipe 
which in turn led to a free discharge of fuel under pressure and 
the resultant fire. 
Examination confirmed that the primary failure of No. S LP 
compressor wheel was due to fatigue at the run-out radius where 
the wheel web forms the rim. There were no other material defects 
found within this wheel or rim which had a considerably lower 
cyclic life than the average in service. 
All other damage was secondary to the fatigue failure; that caused 
by the fire was slight and confined to minor sooting and paint 
blistering. 
(2) Eleotpioal oontinuity oheok of fipe uapning and fuel 
valve oipouits 
Photographic evidence indicates that the leading edge of the port 
wing out to the position of the No.2 fuel shut-off valve was intact 
and not burnt when the aircraft touched down on the run,;ay. The 
fire resistant wiring to the shut-off valve is routed ,;ell behind 
the leading edge away from the seat of the fire and a modification 
had been embodied to ensure that the electrical circuit to a valve 
\;ould remain intact even if an engine broke away from the aircraft. 
Although it ,;as not possible to check the continuity of all the 
wiring from the flight engineer's panel to the fuel shut-off v�lve 
after the accident, this circuit had been tested and found satls­
factory during the pre-flight checks. The fact that the red 
warning light in the fire shut-,?ff hand�e illuminated in f�ight 
confinns the integrity of the fne '<arnmg system at the tlffie the 
fire occurred. 
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During the investigation a continuity check of the remammg 
electrical wiring of the fire warning and fire shut-off valve 
systems was carried out. The ends of the wiring were identified 
at the position where the port wing had broken from the fuselage 
and a check of the systems from this point through to the 
associated flight deck controls was made. The warning light in 
the fire shut-off handle illuminated and the warning bell rang. 
\�en the test was repeated with the bell cancel switch depressed 
the warning light illuminated but the bell did not ring. 
A continuity check of the fuel shut-off valve wiring was also 
carried out from the battery bus bar through the fire shut-off 
handle to the switch on the flight engineer's panel and this was 
found to be satisfactory. 
TIle hydraulic shut-off valve circuit operation was checked in the 
same way as the fuel valve circuit except that the test connections 
were made to undamaged cables where they entered their conduit at 
the rear of the fon;ard freight compartment. From this point the 
circuit was found to operate correctly. 
There was no evidence to suggest that fire in the air affected the 
control of the fuel or hydraulic oil shut-off valves. The valves 
themselves still operated satisfactorily when tested after the 
accident. 
(3) Examination of the fire extinguisher system 
Detailed examination of both No.l and No.2 fire extinguisher 
bottles revealed that both had been severely heated in the fire 
and both were discharged. However, strip examination shO\;ed that: 
Ca) TIle bursting discs on both heads of each bottle \;ere broken; 
Cb) The breakage of the bursting discs was due to the firing of 
the cartridges; 
Cc) The cartridges had fired by overheating, due to the external 
fire; 
Cd) The fusible plug in No.l bottle blew out before the cartridge 
fired; 




At least one element in each head was complete, indicating 
that the cartridge had not been detonated electrically. 
The fire was a secondary effect follo\;ing mechanical . failur� of 
ele fifth stage LP compressor wheel. It can be c0n51dered m two 
stages i.e. - Stage One following immediately upon the compressor 




Fire resulted from the damage sustained when No. 5 LP compressor 
wheel broke up and burst through the compressor casing. This 
displaced and disconnected the main fuel feed pipe. Fuel (kero­
sene) was delivered under pressure by the booster pumps from the 
broken joint at a rate of about SO gal/min (ISO kg/min). 
Ignition, either by ingestion into the damaged compressor and 
thence to the combustion area, or from the hot jet pipe probably 
took place irranediately. M.lch of the starboard cowl ing had been 
knocked off by the broken compressor casing. This would have 
rendered the engine fire extinguishant ineffective. The fuel and 
hydraulic shut-off valves were not closed, consequently the fire 
continued to burn; within a very short space of time it weakened 
the light alloy structure of the pylon and the engine fell away 
from the aircraft. 
Stage Two:Fuel, fed by the booster pumps, continued to burn as it 
issued from the fractured pipe in the remains of the No.2 pylon, 
just fon,ard of the leading edge of the wing. The evidence shows 
that in flight the flames swept back both over and under the wing. 
1I00,ever, after landing and when reverse thrust was applied the 
flames were deflected round the wing itself and in towards the 
fuselage. \I'hen the aircraft came to a standstill the booster 
pumps continued to run probably for about 20 seconds until their 
clectrical circuit 'vas broken by the fire. Explosion released 
more fuel from the port tanks and the fire then spread and 
increased in intensity. 
1.14 Survival aspects 
Almost immediately after take-off, the cabin staff and some 
passengers felt the aircraft shake and then saw that No.2 engine 
was on fire. The "Fasten Seat Belts" notice was still on. After 
visiting the flight deck the chief steward decided that an emergency 
landing was about to be made. In the short time available, and 
"ith the assistance of the other cabin staff he prepared the 
passengers and the aircraft. Just before the landing the check 
captain made a passenger briefing announcement from the flight deck 
by using the public address system but this was either not heard or 
appreciated by the majority of the passengers. 
Before the aircraft came to a stop the cabin staff had opened both 
starboard ovenving exits. After the aircraft came to rest the 
rear starboard door and the forward port and starboard doors were 
opened. The fonvard port ovenving exit was also opened but it is 
not known by whom this was done. 
n,C cabin staff supervised the evacuation, which proceeded as 
follows: 
Starboard overwing exits 
The first passengers to leave the aircraft left by these exits. 
Fourteen men and four women made their escape under the direction 





flames which enveloped the starboard 'ving area 
follOl'l1ng the malll explosIon. Fifteen of the eighteen passengers 
who left by the ovenving exits sustained some fonn of injury when 
gettlllg dOlvn to the ground from the wing. 
Forward popt ovepwing exit 
Nobody left the aircraft by this route. 
Starboard pear gaZZey doop 
After the escape chute had been rigged and inflated, it was found 
to be misaligned. One of the stewards had to climb down to 
straighten it, but then could not re-enter the aircraft. One of 
the stewardesses, Miss Iiarrison, remained at the top to marshal 
the passengers. Only two men and three women escaped down this 
chute before the sparks and flames spreading from the port side of 
the aircraft set it alight and it burst. "I'M) men, two women and 
one child jumped through this doonvay after the chute became un­
serviceable. All the passengers who made their exit from the rear 
galley door sustained some degree of injury. 
Starboard fopward gaZZey doop 
There was a slight delay before the escape chute for this door was 
put into operation, due to difficulty in getting the chute­
retaining bar into its clips, but after this initial delay the main 
body of passengers abandoned the aircraft very rapidly by this 
route. TIle evacuation tended to slow dOlvn as passengers, both 
injured and othenvise, began to collect round the bottom of the 
chute and in front of the starboard wing. During a gap between the 
passengers disembarking the Check Captain left the aircraft by this 
exit. l�en it appeared that all the passengers had left the air­
craft, the remaining cabin crew members also used this escape route. 
Popt forward main doop 
At first the chute did not inflate but this difficulty was overcome 
with the assistance of the Captain. TIle Flight Engineer climbed 
down it to straighten it at the bottom, but almost immediately it 
caught fire and burst. One male passenger escaped from the air­
craft by jumping from this doonvay after the chute had collapsed. 
Cockpit windows, starboard side 
The Second Officer, the First Officer and the Captain left the 
aircraft by this exit. Although they did not report mudl 
difficul ty in making good their escape, hand burns were sustained 
from the nylon tape rope provided. 
GenepaZ 
The evacuation took place in an orderly manner but, when the rear 
galley door and starboard ovenving routes became unusable some 
momentary confusion resulted amongst those passengers who had to 
revise their initial escape routes. In the early stages, conditions 
inside the cabin were quite good, but they deteriorated very 
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rapidly when the integrity of the fuselage was breached by an 
explosion . There was some difficulty in helping passengers at the 
rear of the aircraft which was the first part of the fuselage to 
be oven,'helmed by the fire . It was in this area that the stel-lardess, 
�liss lIarrison, was last seen alive attending to the passengers "ho 
ultimately succumbed . 
1 . 1 6  Engine failure and engine fire drill s  
Set out belOl" are the relevant portions of the two drills which 
"ere in force at the time of the accident . 
L"IGINE FIRE 
NOI'E: Judgement and precision are 
as important as speed \<hen 
putting out an engine fire . 
Actuating a \;rong control could 
cause more trouble than a few 
seconds delay in taking the 
correct action . 
Phase I 
\\'arning Bell E Cancel 
On Corrunand from Captain: 
Thrust Lever E Closed 
Start Lever E Cut-off 
Essential POI,er E Re-selected 
Fire Shut-off E I f  Lt . still 
on PULL 
Phase I I  
Eng-Anti-icing E OFF 
Ext inguisher 
lIyd . Pump 
E Discharged 
E OFF (No . 2  or 3) 
Visual check E checking 
I f  after 30 seconds the fire 
warning light remains ON, or 
goes out then re-illuminates: 
Transfer Switch E Transfer 
Extinguisher E Discharged 
Press Discharge of engine on 
fire, NOT that of second 
bottle 
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Essential POI,er E Re-selected 
Generator E OFF, Cont . 
G . C . R.OPEN 
Eng . Fuel Valve E Closed (if 
danger of 
fire) 
Eng.Anti-icing E OFF 
Ilyd . Pump E OFF (No.2 
or 3) 
19th January 1968 
The vertical layout of each drill, including the introductory 
cautlOn to the fire drill, is that which is printed on the cock­
p1t check l1sts: Ilowever? the relative horizontal layout of the tl:O dnlls as glven here 1S for the purpose of emphasising the 
sl1ll1lanty of certaln of the critical steps in each drill. E 
represents the flight engineer. 
At the time of the accident the practice as shOlm in the BOAC 
operations flying manual "as that Phase I items of the fire drill 
were to be performed from memory. They were not required to be 
verified by being repeated against the check list, as I;as the case 
for Hems of Phase II of the dnll. 
The drills "ere developed by BOAC from those prepared by the air­
craft manufacturers and from those in use by airlines already 
operating tlris type of aircraft. A BOAC addition to the drill 1S 
the allocation of individual ftmctions to crew members. The 
responsibility for pulling the fire shut-off handle has been 
allocated to the Flight Engineer who can only do so if his seat 
belt is very loose. Alterations and adjustments have, on rare 
occasions, been made to improve the drills in the light of 
operating and training experience and of information obtained from 
the manufacturer. It is BOAC's policy to alter the drills only 
when a serious weakness would othen;ise exist since any al teration 
requires not only the introduction of a nel; procedure which has to 
be learned, but also the cancellation of a procedure to which ere'; 
members have become accustomed through training and experience. 
In the light of knowledge gained from the investigation into this 
accident, BOAC have nOl; altered the check list in several respects. 
These two drills have been combined into one and re-named "Engine 
Fire or Severe Failure Drill". It now unconditionally requires 
the fire shut-off handle to be pulled, whether or not a fire 
warning has occurred. In addition, the first item of Phase II is 
confirmation by the "pilot-in-charge" that the fire shut-off handle 
has been pulled. 
It is BOAC' s practice, when carrying out crew drillS, that the 
challenge and response method will be generally applied. Normally, 
the co-pilot reads out the items and the appropriate crew member 
confirms that he has taken the necessary action. However, BOAC 
recognise in their procedures that there may be occasions of 
emergency when this system cannot be used and it becomes necessary 
for the Flight Engineer to both read the items off the list and 
carry out the actions. 
Since the accident the operations flying manual has been revised 
to state more specifically the procedure to be follOl;ed. It now 
requires that after completion of the drill the check list shall 
be read from the beginning and that if the nature of the emergency 
prevents the list being read in the normal manner, the Fl1ght 
Engineer, once the drill has been called for, will �erform and 
check the items himself by reference to the check llSt and that 
whenever a drill has been performed in this way it shall be 
checked by a normal reading of the check list from the beginning 
as soon as possible. 
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Rout� heck Captain 's duties 
The Route Oleck Cap�a in '  s duties �re designed to ensure that agreed standards of oper�tlOn are maIntaIned. The Captain under check operates the sectlOn concerned exactly in accordance with his 
no�l operatIng procedures .  The Check Captain may not request a partlcular procedure and in general i s  expected to be as un­
obtrusive as possible .  
To ensure that the Route Oleck Captain keeps himself fully up to 
date he is required to fly on the routes in contnand for not less 
than one-third of the hours of the average of the captains on the 
regular roster. 
Crew operational procedures 
In addition to the Captain, First Officer and Flight Engineer , a 
third pilot is normally carried in BOAC '  s 707 aircraft , but his 
duties , in so far as they concern assistance to the three normal 
flight deck members , during take-off and landing , are l imited to 
monitoring the operation, if so instructed. 
Captain Taylor normally requires his third pilot to sit in the 
j ump  seat , immediately behind the pilot in charge for take-off and 
landing and to act as an extra pair of eyes , both inside and out­
s ide the cockl'it , to advise the operating crew of any unusual 
circl.U1\Stances . 
On this flight the Captain agreed that the Route Oleck Captain 
should occupy the j ump  seat , s ince this is the best position on 
the fl ight deck for the Route Oleck Captain to observe the take­
off and landing phases of the operation. In consequence the third 
pilot ,;as occupying the navigator ' s  position for take-off, from 
"here monitoring assistance is not possible. Captain Taylor gave 
the Route Oleck Captain the briefing he normally gives to the 
third pilot concerning the monitoring assistance he wished him to 
provide. 
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2 .  A nalysis and Conclusions 
2 . 1  Analysis 
The circumstances of this accident divide conveniently into three 
parts: CA) the engine failure and resulting fire ; CB) matters 
relating to fire drills in the air ; CC) evacuation and survival 
aspects , including the part played by the airport fire and rescue 
services .  This analysis considers these parts separately.  
A Engine faiLure and resuLting fire 
The accident sequence stemmed from a fatigue failure of the No . 2  
engine fifth stage LP compressor wheel , which led to a disruption 
of the compressor casing. The reason for this failure has not 
been determined. The damage caused by the burst wheel resulted in 
the release of fuel �lich ignited in the high temperature area at 
the rear of the engine . A few seconds later the flames flashed 
forward and the resultant heat rise operated the fire warning 
system. 
Examination of the maintenance and overhaul records for this 
engine showed that vibration had been experienced during tests 
prior to its installation in G-ARWE . During this investigation 
this aspect has been given very careful consideration but it has 
not been possible to determine whether this vibration had any 
bearing on the ultimate failure of the engine . 
Al though the primary cause of the fatigue failure is not known, 
research into this aspect is continuing . Subsequent to this 
accident the following precautionary measures have been introduced 
by the manufacturer. 
1 .  An improved polish finish is called for in the run-out radius 
to the rim of the compressor wheels and the minimum thickness 
dimensions in this area have been increased . 
2 .  All compressor wheels are to be subjected to a full magnetic 
crack detection inspection and to be checked for distortion 
at each repair and overhaul . 
B Fire driLLs 
The examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of damage to 
the fuel tanks or defects in the mechanical or electrical elements 
of the fire extinguisher system other than those sustained in the 
ground fire . Photographic and eyewitness evidence shows that 
after the engine and part of the pylon had fallen away , the fire 
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cont inued to burn fiercely from the broken fuel pipe forward of 
the leading edge of the wing . Il11en this is considered with the 
evidence that the fire ext inguisher bottles had not been discharged 
electrical ly, it is apparent that the fire cont inued to burn 
because of the omiss ion to pull the No . 2  eng ine fire shut-off 
luundle ,  as required by the fire drill .  That the handle was not 
pulled is further substantiated by the loss of hydraulic fluid 
which occurred after the engine fell away from the aircraft . The 
hydraul ic shut -off valve , which is also operated by the fire shut­
off handle , ',ould have prevented this loss of hydraul ic fluid if 
it had been closed. Hence it is pertinent to consider why the 
operation of the fire shut -off handle was omitted when the Engine 
Fire Drill was carried out , and why the omission was not noticed 
by the crew on the flight deck. 
When an engine fire of this magnitude occurs , there will inevitably 
be some doubt in the minds of the crew that it may not be possible 
to put it out . Therefore, fire drills must be des igned in the 
knowledge that the s ituation will be treated with a sense of 
considerable urgency. The call for prompt act ion will be 
accentuated if the fire breaks out on take-o H ,  s ince t ime  ,;ill be 
short because a return to the aerodrome for an illlilediate landing 
will be made whenever possible. On this occas ion , latent fears in 
the minds of the crew that the fire might not be controllable were 
heightened by the knowledge of a recent accident to a Boeing 707 
aircraft at Honolulu - involving this aircraft - when the dis­
integration of a turbine wheel during take-off punctured a fuel 
tank. I t  is unlikely that the resulting fire in that case could 
have been put out in the air . 
The drills in force at the t ime of the acc ident are set out in 
paragraph 1 . 16. l1lese had been regularly practised by the crews 
and there is no doubt they could be accomplished successfully 
provided they were performed methodically and with prec is ion . 
However, the circumstances of this acc ident show that in an 
atmosphere of urgency , when the fire drill supplanted the Engine 
Overheat or Failure Drill , confusion could occur between what 
act ions had been completed and wlllit still needed to be done. 
Apart from the act ion to silence the fire warning bell , the drills 
differed only in one critical action, namely the pul ling of the 
fire shut-off handle . 
On this occasion the difference between the two drills ,vas in 
advertently obscured by tile Fl ight Engineer , who went for , but 
did not pull , the fire shut-oH handle whilst carrying out the 
Engine Overheat or Failure Dril l ;  it appears that this not only 
gave him the impress ion that he had pulled the fire shut-,?ff . 
handle as part o f  the fire dril l ,  but also !1ave the same ll"preSs1On 
to the First Officer. 
From the Fl ight Engineer ' s  station , directly facing the fire shut­
off handles , it is not easy to see at a glance tlllit a handle �s 
not been pulled , as its movement , which is di:ectl� towards h�, 
is only half an inch. IIlhen viewed from the S1de, L e .  from elther 
pilot ' s  seat , it is more easily seen . Nevertheless ! b�ause of 
the very small movement it is quest ionable whether 1t 1S 
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sufficiently conspicuous for its position to be readily apparent 
to p1lots wh�se main attention is concentrated on handling the 
aucraft durmg an approach to land in circumstances requiring 
accurate j udgement from external cues . 
I t  is BOAC ' s  view that in some emergency situations the captain 
w1ll be so preoccup1ed with the physical handling of the aircraft 
that he cannot monitor in detail the performance of the drills and 
that he must hence place great reliance on the crew members report 
that the drills have been completed . 
The Check Captain was on the aircraft for the purpose of carrying 
out a check on Captain Taylor and had also been briefed by him to 
draw attention to any unusual circumstances . He did not watch the 
fire drill being carried out but concentrated on keeping the 
Captain informed of the state of the fire and giving him assistance 
to position the aircraft for landing ; he did not notice that the 
fire shut-off handle had not been pulled . By the time he turned 
his attention to the activities on the flight deck itself the 
engine had fallen alVay and consequently the ,,,arning l ight in the 
fire handle had gone out - so that his attention was not dralVn in 
that direction. 
I t  appears that an inherent lVeakness in the drill in use at the 
time lVas that the vital operation of pulling the fire shut-off 
handle relied solely upon memory and required no later check of 
this action. An additional factor leading to the breakdm;n of 
the drill lVas the lVorkload on the First Officer . In the very 
short time available , in addition to his other tasks he lVas 
instructed to make a ' 'Mayday'' cal l .  It must be remembered that 
lVhen he started to read the check l ist the Flight Engineer told 
him the check had already been completed . It is highly significant 
that even if he had read back the items of the fire dril l , as 
required by the operations flying manual , in addition to carrying 
out his other tasks , a check of the fire shut-off handle lVould not 
have been included. 
From the lVeight of evidence it seems that the fire bell did not 
ring because the First Officer, after hearing the undercarriage 
horn start to sound, misidentified the action required and lVas 
pressing the fire bell cancel button at the instant lVhen the bell 
lVould have started to ring. Therefore consideration has been 
given to the possible effect this may have had on the performance 
of the drill s .  No definite conclusion can be reached but there 
is a possibility that the Flight Engineer would have been alerted 
to a greater extent to the need to start lVith the memory items of 
the fire drill if the first action he lVas required to perform had 
been the cancellation of the lVarning bel l .  
C Evacuation and survivaZ aspects 
Little time was available for the cabin staff to prepare the 
passengers for the landing and subsequent evacuation. Neverthe­
less , from the mass of favourable comment from the passengers and 
the evidence available it is clear that everything possible lVas 
done and the cabin staff, under the leadership of the Chief 
Steward , behaved with commendable coolness and efficiency throughout . 
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I t seems certain that the Stewardess , �!iss Harrison, lost her l ife 
\;hilst trying to help passengers at the rear of the aircraft in 
the rapidly deteriorating conditions . I t  is undoubtedly due to 
the efforts of the cabin staff that the loss of l ife was not 
greater . 
111e evidence has shown that the great concern of the passengers to 
take their small belongings with them tends to block up the gan�;ays 
111e fittings of the galley doors escape chutes were not ideal and 
involved , in each case , the positioning of a bar behind clips on 
the cabin floor. It  is understood that a modification has now been 
made by BOAC to facil itate the positioning of the bar but it Kould 
be mucl1 more desirable for the chutes to be designed so that they 
are readily available \;ithout special fitting . 
It is clear that inflatable escape chutes are very susceptible to 
hea t and flame . Since it has been sho�'l1 tha t a very large number 
of passengers can escape down one chute in a short space of time , 
it seems highly desirable that research and development should be 
undertaken in the design of chutes in general and the materials of 
\,hicl1 they are made for greater fire resistant characteristics . 
Even an extra lwlf-minute ' s  use of a chute could save many l ives . 
FiY'e and Y'escue 
The facts established during this aspect of the investigation are 
set out in detail in Annex 1 .  A number of points arising from 
them \,ere brought to the attention of the Board of Trade and the 
British Airports Authority during the suntner of 1968 , so that where 
appropriate , early action could be taken on the lessons learned . 
Annex 1 also contains observations , some of \;hich have no 
particular appl ication to this accident ; however they are of 
importance when future requirements are being considered . Annex 1 
generally needs no ampl ification , but there are four points \;hich 
call for spec ial attention . These are set out below. 
The essence of fighting an aircraft fire is speed and weight of 
initial attack, to isolate the fuselage from the fire and preserve 
clear escape routes and also to attack the source , \;ith the aim of 
diminishing the intensity of the fire itself as quickly as possible . 
lIence , seconds gained in reaching the scene of the fire are 
important . 
With the present locat ion of the main fire station at HeathrOl; in 
relation to the operating runways , there is a potential delay in 
getting to the scene of an accident . Therefore , extreme care must 
be taken to ensure the best possible cOl1l11Ul1ication and l iaison 
between the fire service , the police and ATC , in order to minimise 
any delay. Since this accident some improvements have already 
been effected. lIowever , there remains the longer term question, 
now that the airport is being used more intensively by bigger 
aircraft , of rcvie\;ing the number and location of fire stations . 
The tactical approach to this fire was not entirely in accordance 
wi th accepted training principles . AI though it is accepted that 
the importance of not hazarding equipment is emphasised during 
training , on this occas ion the posit ions taken up by the t"o foam 
tenders brought into use in the early part of the operation here 
not well j udged . Consequently the main foam volume potent ially 
available could neither be appl ied to help to isolate the fuselage 
from the fire , nor to the seat of the fire itself. The design of 
the appl iances used is such that once the snap decis ion to stop 
and make foam has been taken , they become virtually immobile and 
no adjustment to rectify an initial error can be made since the 
appliances cannot make foam and move simultaneously. This is a 
recognised deficiency in the equipment I,hich the British Airports 
Authority will shortly be replacing by new appl iances which can 
make foam and move at the same time . 
The failure of a lUD1dline from the first foam appl iance was serious 
as it reduced the already l imited volume of foam being appl ied to a 
very low figure at a critical time. The reason for the burst hose 
has not been determined . Different hoses of a new design, which 
had been on order for some months before this accident , have nOl, 
been fitted throughout as standard to all foam appl iances and water 
tenders on the airport . 
The amount of water "on wheels" called for by the l icence has been 
calculated on the basis of the existence of the hydrant system, 
which is capable of delivering about 450 gallons of water per 
minute from e ither outlet at any hydrant on the airport . It is 
therefore vital , if there is to be a continuous supply of foam from 
the appliances for any length of time , that the hose-laying and 
coupling procedures do not fail . On this occasion , partly because 
the hose-layer arrived from its exercise later than the rest of the 
main body of appl iances , and partly because of the failure to marry 
one of its hoses with a hydrant , water was not available for about 
a minute from the hydrants when the wheel -borne water ran out . 
There are clearly lessons to be learned from this operation , bear­
ing in mind the increase in density of operations at Heathrow and 
the larger aircraft which will be coming into service before long . 




C i i) 
C i i i) 
Civ) 
The crew was properly l icensed. 
The documentation of the aircraft was in order. 
The maintenance documents show that during a test run 
after a repair, prior to installation in �he a irc�aft , 
there was vibration in No . 2 engine but thIS was In thm 
the l imits laid dOlm by the manufacturer. 
No . 2  engine fifth stage low pressure compressor wheel 
failed due to fatigue. The reason for this has not been 
established. 
(v) The failure of the No . 2  engine compressor wheel caused 
damage to the starboard side of the engine and to its 
COld ing. This resulted in a fuel leak from the engine 
fuel supply l ine and a fire . 
(vi) After starting and before completing an Engine Overheat 
or Failure Drill , it became necessary for the crew to 
carry out a fire dril l .  
(vii) The First Officer ' s  cancellat ion of the fire bell instead 
of the undercarriage warning horn prevented the fire bell 
from ringing . 
(viii) TIle closure of the fuel shut-off valve by pull ing the 
fire handle was inadvertently omitted by the Fl ight 
Engineer when he carried out the fire dril l .  The omission 
was not noticed by the Captain, the First Officer or the 
Oleck Captain . The Second Officer was In no position to 
observe the situation. 
(ix) The failure to close the fuel shut-off valve permitted 
the fire to continue . 
(x) The llOAC Fire and Engine Overheat or Failure Drills in 
force at the time were capable of misapplication under 
stress .  
(xi) The overall efficiency of the airport fire service was 
seriously reduced by some appliance deployment and 
equipment failures . However ,  they were successful in 
preventing the spread of the fire to 3 ,000 gallons of 
fuel in the starboard wing of the aircraft . 
(b) Cause 
The accident resulted from an omission to close the fuel shut-off 
valve ,,'hen No . 2 engine caught fire following the failure of its 
No . 5  low pressure compressor wheel . The failure of the Ivheel I;as 
due to fatigue . 
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3 .  Recommendations 
From the information gained during this investigation , it is 
considered that the follOlving recommendations are pert inent : 
1. Engine fire drills 
There should be a further study of the BOAC 707 engine emergency 
drills , both as to sequence of operation and allocation of 
responsibility for individual items , to ensure that the most 
effective application and checking procedures are used. 
2 .  Airport fire services 
The review of aircraft fire and rescue operations recommended by 
the Fire Services Group (Annex 1 . 11 . 11)  is supported with the 
further recommendat ion that to ensure progress it should, in the 
first instance , be confined to the problems of Heathrol\'. 
3 .  Escape chutes 
Research should be undertaken into the material of lVhich escape 
chutes are made , to obtain greater fire-resistant characteristics 
and into their design and installation to ensure rapid deployment 
and protection against heat for those using them. 
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4. C o m p l i a nce w it h  R e g u l a t i o n s  
In conducting this investigation the provisions of Regulation 7 (5) 
of the Civil Aviation ( Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 
1951 Illive been complied with. Letters were sent to Captain Taylor , 
Captain bss , First Officer Kirkland and Engineer Officer Hicks , 
offering th�m the opportunity of exercising the rights conferred 
by the Regulation and informing them of the facilities available 
for that purpose . 
All concerned indicated that they wished to make representations ; 
these ",ere made at a number of meetings and have been taken into 
account in preparing the report . It was not considered necessary 
to alter the opinion as to the cause of the accident . 
It "'as not considered appropriate to take action under Regulation 
7 (5) in respect of those parts of the report deal ing with the fire 
and rescue aspects of the accident . Nevertheless , the British 
Airports Authority was informed of the contents of Annex 1 and was 
given the opportunity to make representations if it so wished. 
This offer ",as accepted and the representations made have been 
taken into account in the preparation of Annex 1 and in the body 
of the report . 
V A M HUNT 
Chief Inspector of Accidents 
Accidents Investigation Branch 
Board of Trade 
April 1969 
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1 • SlJM.1ARY 
At 1527 hrs . G-AR1\lE took off from Rtmway 28L at Heathrow. Shortly 
after lift-off, No . 2  engine caught fire . The aircraft then made a 
visual circuit and approach to Runway 05R; during this manoeuvre , 
No . 2  engine became detached. The pilot made a smooth landing on 
Runway 05R with a fire at the No . 2  engine position on the port 
wrng. '1'1-'0 British Airports Authority (BM) airport fire service 
appliances and an ambulance from the central area sub-station were 
in attendance very shortly after the aircraft came to rest . The 
main body of the airport fire service from the north side HQ 
station , consisting of seven tmits , arrived some two minutes later. 
Twenty-two vehicles from the London Fire Brigade (LFB) also attended 
and provided back-up assistance to the BM fire service . Of the 126 
occupants , four passengers and one stewardess died as a result of 
the fire. No other aircraft or grotmd installations were involved 
in the large fire which developed . 
2 .  FUNCTIONS OF THE FIRE SERVICE 
The primary aim of the aerodrome fire service is  to save l ives . 
TI,e tactics employed at the scene of an aircraft accident must be 
governed by this philosophy. The minimising of damage to the air­
craft or any other structures is incidental to the primary aim and 
must always be subordinated to it . 
3 .  NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 
Timing 
In order to maintain a clear relat ionship between one event and 
another , times in this report will be given both in GMT and 
relative to the time the aircraft came to rest - 1531 hrs . or "A" 
time. 
Take-off 
At 1527 hrs . (A-4 m. ) G -ARI\lE took off on Rtmway 28L with a 
complement of II crew and ll5  passengers . The fuel load was 
2 2 ,000 kg of aviation kerosene using the wing tanks only with an 
empty centre fuselage tank. 
Engine fire 
Shortly after l ift-off a portion of engine COWling was seen to 
fall from the aircraft and a fire '''as observed on the port wing. 
At 152 7 . 52 hrs . (A-3m.8s . )  '�\lE" reported a fire in No . 2  engine . 
At 1 528 . 7  hrs . (A-2m. 53s . )  Air Traffic Control (ATC) confirmed a 
fire visible on the port ,,,ing. At 1528 .35 hrs . 0-2m. 25s . )  "1\lE" 
broadcast a distress message and requested a landrng on the 
first available Ttmway. At 1528 . 4 5  hrs . (A-2m . 1 5 s . )  ATC offered 
Rtmway 05R for landing , which was accepted by the pilot . The 
aircraft made a smooth touchdown and came to rest in Block 49  at 
approximately 1531 hrs . (A) . It was slightly to the left of the 
Ttmway centre-line and slewed to port on a magnet1c headrng of 
035 degrees with the port wing tip close to the grass verge at 
the edge o f
'
the Ttmway; there was l ittle wind. 
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Crash aZal'm 
The BAA fire services were alerted at l5Z8 hrs . (A-3m. )  by means 
of the crash bells and the direct telephone crash line from ATC .  
TI,ey were informed at l5Z9 hrs . (A-Zm. )  that an aircraft accident 
'''as imninent on Runway OSR. 
Rendezvous point for outside services was designated as "South_ 
east" ; at 1530 hrs (A-lm . )  the rendezvous point was changed by 
ATC to "North" , which is situated outside the BAA main north side 
fire station. 
There was some uncertainty by ATC as to where the aircraft would 
eventually come to a stop and this caused a t ime interval between 
the crash bells sounding and the loud speaker announcement by the 
BAA fire service watchroom attendant giving the type and location 
of the emergency . This interval has been variously estimated as 
being betl,een 30 and 45 seconds . 
Sub-station attendanae 
hhen the two fire appliances and ambulance from the central area 
sub-station turned out they saw the aircraft on short final for 
Runway 05R. They observed the landing and followed the aircraft 
down the runway , arriving at the aircraft at approximately 
lS31 . 30 hrs . (A+Om. 3Os . ) . As they drew up by the aircraft there 
,,'as a large explosion from the area of the port wing , which threw 
wTeckage over the fuselage . The foam/COZ tender [VXN 863) 
positioned to the left of the port tailplane and about 70 feet 
astern of it . TI,e accompanying water tender (SXT lZO) then 
started to transfer water to the foam/COZ tender.  The monitor and 
both near and offside hand l ines were brought into operation , 
concentrating on the area of the fuselage adjacent to the port rear 
cabin door, which was closed. The monitor was shut down , possibly 
due to a fault in the foam proport ioning equipnent ; in any case , 
it ,,"as too far away to allow it to be used effectively. When the 
monitor was shut dOI;n , the offside hand l ine burst .  The nearside 
hand l ine was too far aI"ay from the fire to make any s ignificant 
contribution to the control of the fire. At the time the offside 
line ruptured , the fire following another explosion spread rapidly 
towards the tail of the aircraft , bursting the starboard rear 
escape chute . Up to this t ime people had been using it to escape . 
TI,e burst length of hose was replaced in about a minute and both 
hand l ines continued to produce foam for an estimated further four 
minutes before both VXN 863 and SXT lZO ran out of water at about 
1538 hrs . (A+7m. ) .  An attempt was then made to use the 400 lb COZ 
on the appl iance. However, the hose reel became disconnected and 
the gas was discharged uselessly. 
�uin station attendanae 
During the t ime that the sub-station appliances were operat ing, 
there were a series of explosions , the largest of which caused 
the aircraft to break its back in l ine with the wing root trail­
ing edge . This occurred at about the time that the main body of 
the BAA fire service arrived, at about lS33 hrs . (A+Zm. ) .  The 
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port wing was burning vigorously, fed initially by fuel under 
pressure and passengers were evacuating in a steady stream from 
the starboard s ide fon;ard door using the inflatable escape chute . 
At the time of the crash alarm sounding , three aircraft ';ere making 
approaches to Run,;ay 28R, the first two separated by about 90 
seconds . The first aircraft had already started its landing flare 
manoeuvre and carried out a normal landing ; the second and third 
aircraft were instructed to - and did - overshoot . It was not 
possible for ATC to give runway crossing clearance to the appl iances 
from the north side station until the aircraft concerned had either 
landed or accepted overshoot instructions . The Air Controller «as 
the only person in a position to co-ordinate the movements of air­
craft and the airport fire service . The actual delay in getting 
clearance to cross the runway has been estimated as being between 
30 and 4 5  seconds . 
One foam tender (SXT 118) was positioned on the grass clear of the 
runway roughly in l ine with the aircraft nose on the port s ide and 
some 65 feet from the edge of the runway. The supporting water 
tender (SXT 119) stopped adj acent to it and started to transfer 
water to the foam tender. As the appliance was sited out of range , 
the monitor was not used. Two side l ines were deployed , but 
shortly after the offside line had started to produce foam , the 
hose burst . The defective l ine was replaced in about a minute and 
the foam applied to the port wing area. At about 1541 hrs . (A+lOm. ) ,  
i . e .  after some 8 minutes of operation, both SXT 118 and SXT 119 
had used up their mobile supplies and ran out of water . 
Hose-layer 
The hose-laying vehicle , (182 BLR) whose task was to connect both 
VXN 863 and SXT 118 to the hydrant system , was in the central 
terminal area on an exercise at the t ime of the accident and did 
not hear the RlT messages relating to the emergency. Ho«ever , 
the crew saw the smoke pall from the fire and proceeded to the 
site as quickly as possible , arriving at 1 534 hrs . (A+3m . )  
approximately a minute after the north s ide station vehicles . Two 
hoses were connected to the nearest hydrant , No . 253 , and laid as 
far as SXT 118 . \�en water pressure was applied, one hose coupling 
refused to remain married with the hydrant and blew out , so water 
to that l ine was shut off. \�ilst the cre'; of the hose-layer were 
occupied with the blown coupling , the charged serviceable l ine from 
hydrant No . 253 was not connected to any appl iance . \�en VXN 863 
and SXT 120 ran out of water, one of their crew drove the hose­
layer up to VXN 863 and connected with the charged line from the 
hydrant . The coupling that would not marry with the hydrant was 
later connected satisfactorily to hydrant No . 2 54 after the hose 
had been man-handled there from hydrant No . 253 , a distance of about 
300 feet ; this latter operation took about 8 minutes , by which 
time SXT 118 SXT 119 VXN 863 and SXT 120 were all out of water . " . 
It is  estimated that between approxumately 1541 hrs . (A+IOm. )  and 
1542 hrs . (A+ llm. ) no fire extinguishing media was bein¥ applied 
to the fire. By this time all survivors had left the a1rcraft . 
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Cartiox 
TIle Cardox COz truck (VXN 876) , being the slowest appl iance , 
arrived at the accident just after the majority of vehicles and 
posit ioned adjacent to the aircraft nose on the port side .  It 
discharged C02 in bursts and , moving forward as the flames were 
suppressed , achieved a good knockdOlm of the fire as far as the 
wing root . Unfortunately, it had used up its charge of gas as it 
was achieving a measure of control over the fire but there was no 
foam j et in a posit ion to consolidate the gains it had made ; 
consequently, the fire then spread rapidly. 
Domest ic tender 
The third foam tender (SXT 111)  designated by BAA as the "domestic" 
fire tender , was at first positioned at the port s ide fon.ard of 
the aircraft nose on the gras s .  The crew then proceeded to assist 
in the rescue as instructed. TIlis appliance was not used in the 
initial attack on the fire but was later moved to the starboard 
s ide of the aircraft , ahead of the wing t ip ,  where it successfully 
prevented the fire taking a hold on the starboard wing, which 
contained about 3 ,000 gallons of fuel . 
Rescue tender 
TIle rescue tender,  VXN 878 , crewed by its driver and a fire 
officer , posit ioned initially by the nose of the aircraft . TIle 
driver subsequently donned breathing apparatus (BA) and tried to 
make an entry through the port forward cabin door. 1\,0 firemen 
wearing BA made repeated attempts to enter through both port and 
starboard fon,ard doors ,.ithout success , due to the intense heat . 
A water hose l ine they started to use ran out of water at about 
8 minutes after the commencement of operations . TIle ZOO Ib dry 
powder from the rescue tender was then used albeit unsuccessfully 
on the ceiling of the aircraft cabin near the starboard forward 
door. 
All early attempts to enter through the starboard rear door failed, 
due to the intense heat . Later , firemen with BA entered through 
this door , supported by foam and water spray. 
Land Rover 
The senior BAA fire officer on duty travelled to the scene by 
Land Rover in company with the main station appl iances .  People 
were leaving the aircraft in a steady stream by means of the star­
board fon;ard door and escape chute . �� gave general assistance 
and helped a woman dOlm who had collapsed at the top of the chute; 
she was followed by two men who were the last people to leave the 
aircraft alive . 
LFB attendance 
TIle London Fire Brigade (LFB) and London Ambulance Service (LAS) 
were alerted at 1533 hrs . (A+2m. )  by the BAA ,.atchroom attendant 
and the first fire appliance arrived at the "North" rendezvous 
point at 1538 hrs . (A+7m. ) .  TIlere was some delay bef?re the 
first group of LFB appl iances moved off under BAA po11ce escort . 
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The LFB and BAA do not agree as to the reasons for this delay . 
The senior LFB officer with the first attendance of the LFB left 
his appl iance and entered the BAA watchroom. He maintains that he 
was infonned that a Boeing 707 aircraft with 131 persons on board 
had caught fire on emergency landing and its port wing was al ight ; 
the fire was under control and his appliances Here to remain at 
the rendezvous point . In view of the apparent size of the fire , 
however , he decided to go forward with his appliances . The BAA 
Hatchroom attendant recorded in the log that the LFB were "on 
station" at 1 537 hrs . (A+6m. )  and given all informat ion regarding 
the accident . At 1 538 hrs . (A+7m . )  a signal Has received from the 
senior BAA officer at the scene of the accident request ing that 
the LFB should be sent fon,ard . The LFB were informed and left 
under BAA police escort . lVhen further LFB appliances arrived at 
the rendezvous point , they were held up aHaiting escort vehicles 
to take them to the accident , as all the available BAA police 
vehicles had departed with the first LFB contingent . In the event , 
off duty BAA firemen acted as guides and directed the appliances 
to the scene of the accident . The LFB attendance comprised 22 
vehicles and provided water,  manpoHer and equipment in support of 
the BAA fire service . 
The fire was finally extinguished and five bodies l;ere recovered 
from the extreme rear of the cabin. 
4 .  MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT SCALES 
The scales of provision of fire fighting and rescue services at 
aerodromes are promulgated by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) as guidance material and specified by the 
Board of Trade (BOT) as part of the UK licensing regulations . 
The Board of Trade sets out its standards in Section VI of Civil 
Air Publ ication (CAP) 168 , The Licensing of AepodPomes . This 
includes quantities of media ,  rescue equipment , personnel , train­
ing and emergency organisation. lCAO and the BOT use a different 
process in calculating the basic fire fighting requirements .  
HOHever ,  for a given aerodrome it is possible to compare
. 
the tl,O 
scales directly. For HeathrO\; Airport , London, the detalls l;ere 




Principal Secondary agent category agent 
Water Foam Discharge rate - CO2 imp gaL l iquid water/foam 
imp gaL solution lb 
imp gaL min 
(5% foam 
l iquid) 
ICAO (a) not 
Cat X 5 , 280 specified 880 (d) 1 , 200 
Bar 
Cat I X  5 , 280 269 600 (d) 1 , 500 
Provided 4 ,050 670 1 ,200 (d) 6 ,400 














(b) Supported by hose-layer/foam l iquid carrier (300 imp gal) 
to l ink  with airport hydrant system , giving a continuous 
supply of water. 
(c) The ICAO exchange rate for excess provision of secondary 
agent equates the extra CO2 to 880 imp gal of water . 
(d) Foam expansion rate 10 : 1 . 
Due to the existence of the water hydrant system at Heathrow , the 
4 ,050 imp gal of mobile water is considered by the l icensing 
authority to be adequate ,  when supported by the hose-laying 
appliance . \�en this vehicle is out of service , it is replaced 
by two water tenders , in which case the amount of mobile water 
available exceeds the minimum l icensing requirement of 5 , 280 imp 
gal . 
A descript ion of the main characteristics of the fire appliances 
at Ilea throw can be found at Appendix A to this report . At the 
time of the accident , the dispoSition of fire appliances at 
I lea throw was as follows : 
Main Stat ion North Side ���or 
2 foam tenders SXT ll1/SXT 118  
1 water tender SXT 119  
1 rescue tender VXN 878 
1 Cardox C02 tender VXN 876 
1 Land Rover ALF 676 . B  
1 ambulance SXT 98 
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Sub-Station , Central Area 
(situatea in No . l  passenger pier) 
1 foam/CO tender 
1 \�ater t�nder 
1 ambulance 
In Central Area 
(roving) 









This appl iance was on a topography exercise 1fi the central 
tenninal area . 
All these vehicles were equipped with single channel VHF radio 
sets operat ing on the BAA fire service frequency. In addition 
two portable radio pack-sets were available tuned to the same 
' 
frequency . One set was in the rescue tender and the other was in 
the ambulance , which was based at the main station. 
The firemen were dressed in the standard protective clothing for 
airport fire services in the UK .  This includes a helmet with 
movable transparent visor, heavy cloth tunic , serge trousers with 
waterproof leggings and leather knee boots .  A total of four sets 
of breathing apparatus (BA) equipment were provided - two in the 
rescue tender and two in one of the foam tenders at the main 
station. 
5 .  SITING OF FIRE STATIONS 
There are two BAA fire stations at Heathrow Airport , London. The 
main station is s ituated to the north of and roughly midway along 
Runway 28R/IOL. There is also a sub-station located to the south 
of the central tenninal area at the extremity of �Umber 1 
passenger pier. (See Appendix D . )  
The geography of the airport is such that appl iances from the main 
fire station situated outside the runway system must cross a ma1fi 
runway for any turnout other than to Runway 28R/IOL . 
lCAO in its Aerodrome Manual recommends that rescue and fire 
fighting operations on an airport should be initiated within 3 
minutes "under optimum conditions of visibility and surface 
conditions". 
Tests carried out subsequent to the accident showed that the run­
ning time for vehicles from the main station to the site of the 
accident at Block 49 , following the same route as was used by the 
appl iances travelling to the accident , i . e .  crossing 28R at 
Block 2/11 then via outer taxiway, was 2 minutes 30 seconds for 
the fastest vehicle and 3 minutes 5 seconds for the slowest 
vehicle .  To these times must be added 25 to 35 seconds for the 
average turnout time between the crash bell sounding and the 
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vehicles moving off. The time for vehicles from the sub-station 
to reach Block 49 was 1 minute 20 seconds plus 25  seconds for the 
turnout . There were no runway crossing delays encountered on these 
t:1al runs . Test runs to other parts of the airport indicated that 
',1th the runway crossIDg delays that are inherent with the location 
of the main station , response times of 5 minutes or more could be 
expected before units from the main station \Vere in attendance at 
the remoter corners of the airport , although on many occasions the 
sub-station foam appliance and water tender could attend " i  thin the 
lCAO recommended time . 
Prior to the creation of the BAA there was a long history 
\Vith the siting and number of fire stations at Heathro\V . 
ranged from a main central stat ion \Vith two satellites at 
points between the run\Vays east and \Vest , to the present 
configurat ion . 




A high pressure \Vater ring-main system designed to operate at a 
pressure of 125 psi and capable of delivering 450 gal/min at any 
outlet is installed at Heathro\V for fire fighting purposes . At 
the relevant time 248 outlets were provided. The hydrants are 
inspected by the BAA fire service every three months . Record 
cards are maintained and defects are logged as and \Vhen they are 
not iced and the BAA Engineering Department informed for action. 
In the past it is apparent that appreciable delays have occurred 
before faults have been rectified. Nine weeks after this accident , 
hydrants Nos . 253 and 254 \Vere seen to be in a poor state of 
repair: one had a bent valve spindle and the other had a \Vasher 
missing. Random checks on other hydrants showed that a number had 
heavy deposits of paint on them. 
7 .  PERSONNEL 
The BAA fire service at Heathro\V is contnanded by a Deputy Chief 
Fire Officer. He also acts as deputy to the BAA Chief Fire 
Officer at headquarters in London . Nevertheless , he gives priority 
to his airport dut ies . This officer has full -time responsibilities 
at Heathrow for organisat ion , administration, operational matters , 
l iaison and fire prevention. He is assisted by two Aerodrome Fire 
Officers , Grade I (AFO 1) . One of the officers is responsible in 
the main for all operational matters , whereas the other is more 
concerned with administrative duties . These three senior officers 
are normally available during normal \Vorking hours . After normal 
office hours including Saturdays and Sundays the command of the 
airport fire service is vested in an AFO 11.  
The minimum manning requirements for aerodrome fire services are 
not precisely defined either by lCAO or in CAP 168 , except for 
the lower categories of aerodromes .  Both authorities state that 
"sufficient personnel" should be available to man the appl iances 
provided . Also , the minimum number of men should be available in 
the immediate vicinity of the equipment to deploy one maj or f1re 
appl iance or alternat ively appl iances carrying one third of the 
extinguishing media required, whichever is the greater, �d ID 
addition to bring into immediate use any l ight rescue veh1cle . 
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�CAO gives guidance on the scope of fire servlce training programmes 7fl th7 Aerodrome Manual , Part
,
S, which also reflects the UK policy In thlS matter, CAP 168 requlres personnel employed on fire and res7ue dutles �o be fully trained in the use of fire and rescue equl�ment and In �eroplane fire fighting and rescue techniques , To glV7 real mean7flg to the expression "fully trained" the Board of Trade 7fltroduced In , 1966 a system of voluntary training and 
certiflcatlon for alrport fire service personnel based on the 
courses at the Bar Fire Service Training School. This voluntary 
scheme calls for SO per cent of the aerodrome fire and rescue 
personnel to be in possession of certificates of competence and for 
these to be renewed every 5 years. 
The BAA sends all of its fire service officers and men to the Bar 
Fire Service Training School and returns them for continuation 
training every third year of service. This corresponds with the 
practice established by the Bar for its own fire service, from 
which the greater proportion of BAA ' s  fire service staff were 
transferred. 
Since there are very few breaks in flying activities at lIeathrow, 
it is not possible, between their three-yearly visits to the Fire 
Service Training School, to give firemen many realistic "hot" fire 
practices without bringing the operational cover below standard. 
This is a problem common to all aerodrome fire services. 
A fire service watchroom is permanently manned at the main fire 
station. The watchroom in the sub-station is manned by a fire­
man who is the water tender driver; after responding to a call 
out, the sub-station is unmanned. 
The main station watchroom attendant, M10 amongst his other duties 
has to maintain a ,;ritten log of signals and events, experiences 
a very high workload during the early stages of an aircraft 
emergency. furing normal working hours, five days a week, a store­
man who is an ex-fireman can, when available, assist in the watch­
room to relieve the attendant of some of his duties. 
At the time of call out for the subject accident, the available 
BAA fire service personnel on duty were as follows: 
2 Aerodrome Fire Officers (AFO) 
1 Aerodrome Fire Officer 
1 Section Leader 
6 Leading Firemen 
1 6  Firemen 
Grade I 
Grade I I  
Twenty-one men responded to the initial call. One AFO I was in 
the stores and made a late attendance. One Leading Fireman was 
on duty as the watchroom attendant and one Fireman - a foam 
tender crew member - was acting as the duty driver and was not 
available. Two men were in the central area in the hose-layer 
and made a late attendance, arriving at the scene of the fire at 
about 1534 hrs. (A+3m.). 
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8 .  COt-MJNICATIONS 
Three separate direct telephone l ines are provided between Air 
Traffic Control CATC) and the BAA fire service watchroom : 
Crash line - a unidirect ional l ine from ATC to the fire 
service watch room. A cal l from ATC illuminates a l ight on 
the watchroom console and sounds the alarm bells .  This line 
is monitored by the airport PBX , the BAA police information 
room and the fire service sub-station watchroom. 
Emergency line - a two-way line between ATC and the fire 
services watch room. It  is used for all Full Emergency and 
Standby procedures .  This l ine is monitored by the PBX , the 
BAA police information room and the fire service sub-station 
watchroom. 
Liaison line - a two-way l ine between ATC and the fire service 
watchroom. This l ine is not monitored by either the PBX or 
the BAA police . 
Direct linea are also available betl;een the BAA fire service 
watchroom and Ci)  the London Fire Brigade control room at Wembley , 
Headquarters Northern COl1lT\and ;  Cii) the London Ambulance Service , 
Kenton ; and Ciii)  the BAA police information room. At the time 
of the subject accident the third l ine was not available due to 
maintenance I,ork being carried out . 
Rendezvous points 
The purpose of the rendezvous points is to provide convenient 
rallying points for the off airport emergency services ; they 
have no relevance as far as the position of the airport fire 
service appliances are concerned . Each rendezvous point is 
provided I"ith an airport PBX extension , except rendezvous point 
"North" which is in front of the main fire station. 
Fire service watchrooms 
lI'hen ATC operates the crash switch, alarm bells ring in both main 
and sub-station watchrooms . The attendants cancel their respective 
bells , note down the message and immediately relay the information 
over their loudspeaker systems . The main station attendant then 
alerts the LFB and LAS on the direct telephone l ines . 
VHF radio 
The following BAA services have their own single disc:ete VHF. radio frequencies - Fire Service ; Police ; MY and Marshall1ng Sect1on . 
The ��tropolitan Pol ice, the London Fire Brigade and the London 
Ambulance Service have various VHF frequencies of their OIm .  
The ATC Ground Movement Controller C��) had one VHF frequency, 
now increased to two . 
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At the time of the accident there were twenty-one different w w  
frequenc1es operated by seven separate agencies concerned with 
f1re f1ght1ng and rescue operations at Heathrow, but no provision 
had been
.
made for d1rect communication between the various 
author1t1es or for monitoring other services ' frequencies ,  apart 
from a select1ve cal�1ng (SELCAL) facility provided between some 
of the BAA f1r� serv1ce ve�icles and the GMC position in ATC , 
w�ereby actuat10n of a sW1tch by the fire officer illuminates a 
l 1�ht and sounds a buzzer in ATC.  A switch is then made in ATC 
wh1<;:h allows duect RIT contact between the a.t::: and the fire 
ve�1cle . 1�en the fire officer wishes to sever contact the Selcal 
sW1tch has to be reset by ATC .  If this is not done GMC signals 
can saturate the fire service frequency. 
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9 . Al-ffiULANCES 
Two ambulances are provided by the BAA at Heathrow , manned by 
f1remen. One ambulance 1S based at each airport fire station . 
These vehicles are in constant use for domestic purposes : for 
example,  carrying incapacitated passengers to and from aircraft. 
In an emergency, the London Ambulance Service can provide a dozen 
or so two-stretcher ambulances at Heathrow within 15 minutes . 
At the time of the subject accident , the ambulance located at the 
main fire station was allocated the duty of following the hose­
layer to the appropriate hydrant and then provide a temporary 
communications l ink  between the hydrant and the fire appl iances , 
using the radio pack set . 
10. OBSERVATIONS 
10.1 Response time 
The first intimation ATC had of an impending accident was the call 
from '11'1:" which tenninated at 152 7 . 58 hrs. (A-3m. 2s.) reporting a 
fire in No.2 engine . The Air Controller confirmed a fire visible 
on the port wing in his transmission ending at 1528 . 14 hrs. 
(A-2m.46s . ) .  Due to heavy RIT traffic on the tower frequency the 
first opportunity that the Air Controller would have had to speak 
on the crash line would have been for a 15 second period between 
1528.18 hrs. (A-2m.42s.) and 1528.33 hrs . (A-2m.27s. ) .  At that 
time "WE" was cleared for a visual circuit for a landing on 
Runway 28L. From the evidence of the Air Controller it is 
apparent that he operated the crash switch at abo�t 1528 .20 hrs. 
(A-2m.40s.) but it was not then clear where the a1rcraft would 
land. After '11'1:" broadcast a ' 'Mayday'' message requesting a 
landing on the first available runway, the Controller offered the 
pilot Runway 05R this was accepted. The next opportun1ty the 
Controller would
' 
have had to speak on the crash line was for a 
26-second period between 1528 . 50 hrs . (A-2m . lOs . )  and 1529 . 16 hrs. 
(A-lm.44s . ) .  It seems probable that he passed the message recorded 
by the BAA fire service between these times. This would correlate 
with a longer than usual interval between the sounding of the crash 
bells and the loudspeaker announcement of the details of the 
impending accident that was commented on by most firemen. It 
would seem that the Air Controller made the crash switch at the 
earliest time that could be considered reasonable , i . e .  subsequent 
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to confirmation, in this case visual , of the initial fire report . 
Detailed informat ion as to the pilot ' s  intent ions at that t ime was 
not available to the Air Controller. When a decision was made to 
land on Rtmway OSR this informat ion \Vas passed to the fire service 
Idthout delay. 
The watchroom attendants at Heathrow , after cancelling the crash 
bells , noted do�n the message and re-broadcast it over the loud­
speaker systems in both fire stations . Experience ,  at some other 
airports I,here the ATC message is broadcast over the loudspeaker 
system at the same time as it is recorded by the watch room 
attendant , indicates that a saving of some 1 5  seconds in response 
time may be achieved by this method . In addition to reducing the 
I,orkload on the I,atchroom attendant , automatic recording o f  fire 
service RlT and telephone channels �uuld have made a detailed 
analysis of the sequence of events easier and more precise . On 
leaving the main station, it is necessary for the officer in 
charge to make an ilmlediate decision whether to turn right or 
left . In this instance , as he knew that the aircraft was on fire 
and attempting to land on Rtmway OSR he decided to turn right and 
to cross Rtmway 28R at Blocks 2/1 1 . This I\uuld ensure the most 
direct routing to the threshold of Rtmway OSR. In the event , as 
the aircraft came to rest well do�n the runway , the most expedi­
tious rout ing to the accident site would have been via Blocks 
4/14 , saving about 20 seconds but this would have required the 
vehicles to have turned left immediately on leaving the station. 
Due to landing aircraft , the north side appliances were delayed 
in their crossing of RlD1way 28R. With a fire station situated 
outside a runway complex , as at Heathrow, rlD1way crossing delays 
are to be expected as a matter of course . l�en the fire vehicles 
received crossing clearance , relayed via the watchroom, a large 
smoke c loud was seen beyond the central area buildings ; from 
other evidence this would indicate that the rlD1way crossing t ime 
was , at the earliest , 1531 hrs . (A) i . e .  when the aircraft came 
to rest at Block 4 9 .  Taking turn-out and rtmning times into 
aCCOlD1t this Kould give a TlD1way crossing delay of between 30 and 
4 5  seconds . This time interval also relates closely to the third 
aircraft approaching Rtmway 28R overshooting. l�en the fire 
vehicles saw the smoke pall they changed direct ion and proceeded 
via the outer taxiway to the north of the central area to Block 49 . 
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) and the London Ambulance Service 
(LAS) were not notified, by the BAA fire service on the direct 
telephone l ines , lD1til 1533 hrs . (A+2m. ) ,  four minutes after the 
emergency was notified to the fire service l;atchroom. This can 
partly be attributed to a high watchroom �urkload. Arrangements 
are being made for the LFB to be alerted at the same time as the 
BAA . LFB appl iances will  receive details of the accident by 
radio whilst on the run-in to the airport . 
The first appl iances of the LFB arrived at the "North" rendezvous 
point Imich is situated outside the north side fire station , at 
1538 hrs. (A+7m . ) .  There was some delay at the rendezvous point , 
sufficiently long for the senior LFB officer to ente: the watch­
room and make inquiries as to the details of the acc1dent . The 
first LFB group then moved off lrith a BAA police escort , arriving 
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at the accident �t abo�t 1543 hrs . (A+12m. ) .  I f  the LFB had been lnformed ?f th� 1mpendlng accident at the same t ime as the BAA flre servlce , l . e .  1529 hrs . (A-2m . )  and there had been no delay In moVlng off from the rendezvous point then it ��uld be reason­
able to expect the first LFB appl iances to have arrived at the 
accldent at 1538 hrs . (A+7m . ) , 5 minutes earlier than they did. 
As the attendance of the LFB is automatic for aircraft accidents 
and aircraft ground incidents there should have been no doubts as 
to the LFB participation in an actual aircraft accident . There 
should be no delay in moving the LFB appl iances on from the 
rendezvous point under police escort . As the LFB send fire 
appliances from a I<idely scattered netl<Ork of stations it fo11ol<s 
th�t the LFB vehicles tend to arrive at the designated rendezvous 
POlnt plecemeal rather than in a body . 
Due to �roblems of communication and the complexity of the runl<ay 
and taxl1<ay systems at the airport , it is essential that escorts 
for outside rescue services should have a sound working knol<ledge 
of the alrport layout and if posslble R/T contact with ATC .  
The BAA police are charged in the Heathrol< Emergency Orders with 
providing escort vehicles to lead the local authority rescue 
service vehicles from the designated rendezvous point to the scene 
of the accident . Tl<o radio-equipped police cars are required to 
be provided but not infrequently due to manning and equipment 
problems only one such vehicle was available. In the case of the 
subj ect accident there I<ere no pol ice escort vehicles present to 
provide guides to ambulances and fire appliances arriving after 
the first LFB attendance . In the event it 'vas fortuitous that BAA 
firemen off duty ';ere available to act as guides . 
I t  is felt that there is room for improvement in the l iaison 
betl<een the BAA fire service, the BAA police and the LFB and LAS . 
In the circumstances of a major aircraft accident the saving of 
t ime is vitally important and it is imperative that all the rescue 
services should respond smoothly and rapidly to a ,yell  integrated 
and organised plan. 
The fire appliances from the central area sub-station responded 
rapidly to the crash call and in fact fol lowed . 
the aircraft down 
the runway on its landing run. Under the partlcular clrcumstances 
of this accident it is considered that these two appliances could 
not have gone into action sooner than they did. 
10 . 2  Deployment of fire appliances 
VXN 863 and SXT 120 
The first two fire appl iances to reach the scene of the accident 
were the foam/CO tender (VXN 863) and the water tender (SXT 120) 
from the sub-sta�ion . From the evidence available , it is apparent 
that VXN 863 stopped at about 70 fee� short of. the port tailplane 
of the aircraft · SXT 120 drel< up adjacent to lt so as to be In a 
position to tr�sfer water. �he monitor . and tl<O hand lines were 
then brought into action . \�lst the .
allgnment of the vehlcle 
was in accordance with accepted practlce , lt I<3S too far away for 
the monitor to be able to bring its output of 2 ,000 gallons of 
foam per minute to bear significantly for the protection of the 
fuselage . 
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It must be remembered that with the type of equipment being used 
once the
. 
snap decision to stop and make foam has been made , then
' 
the appllance is virtually immobilised. The monitor was therefore 
hurriedly shut down , which was possibly the cause of the offs ide 
hand l ine bursting, due to a pressure surge . The absence of 
pressure reducing valves in the foam system requires the pump and 
monitor operators to execute a closely synchronised drill . As a 
result , the potential output of 4 ,CXXl gallons per minute of foam 
from this appl iance was reduced in a very short whil e ,  possibly 
less than a minute , to 1 ,CXXl gallons per minute . (See Appendix B . )  
The offside hand l ine operator placed himself in a position to 
apply foam to the port side rear passenger door , which was closed, 
and achieved some success in preventing the spread of fire under 
the fuselage in the vicinity of the starboard rear escape chute . 
TIle near side hand l ine operator was standing too far from the 
fuselage to contribute significantly to the suppression of the 
fire . Therefore , the bursting of the off side hand l ine signifi­
cantly reduced the efficiency of this fire unit during the 
critical period when evacuation was taking place. In addition to 
the loss of foam-producing capacity , the burst l ine would have 
resulted in the loss of a considerable volume of valuable water 
which , in view of tlte delay in connection to the airport ,;ater 
main ,  could have usefully extended the period that foam could be 
produced before the two appliances ran out of water . 
The tt,o hand line operators were faced ,;ith a situation involving 
explosions and an extensive fuel spillage fire . IVith the limited 
range of their IOX branch pipes they had to concentrate on the 
spillage fire , although to have been most effective they would 
have needed to have extended their l ines and taken up positions 
level with the port rear door. 
l\�en an attempt was made to use the CO2 the gas escaped after the 
hose became detached from the reel . The equipment manufacturer 
states that if it is properly assembled this should not happen . 
It has not been possible to determine the exact circumstances in 
this case. However ,  as an extra precaution a locking I;asher has 
now been added. Although it is doubtful if 400 lb of CO� could 
have contributed much to the suppression of the fire , thlS failure 
cannot be dismissed l ightly. 
SXT 1 1 8  and SXT 1 1 9  
TIle first foam unit from the north side stat ion to arrive at the 
accident was the foam tender SXT 118 and its attendant water 
tender SXT 1 1 9 .  The logical position for these vehicles to have 
taken up would have been adjacent to the port forward cabin door . 
As it was the remote initial positioning of these vehlcles , out 
of range �f the 20X monitor , immediately reduced the potent ial 
foam output from 4 ,CXXl gallons per minute to the output of the . 
tl,rQ hand lines , i .  e .  2 ,  CXXl gallons per minute . The t'."o hand l 1ne 
operators gave their initial attention to the fuel .
splllage �d 
outer wing fires on the port slde and not the cntlcal port wmg 
root area. From the evidence available, it would seem that the 




��tured th� fuselage and caused the internal fire to take a Inn o .  . If  thlS was In fact the case then it is considered doubtful If better positioning of these vehicles would have prevented the loss of life that did occur . The burst that occurred on the offslde hand line further reduced the output of this unit to 1 ,000 gallons of foam per minute . As one of the crew from SXT 118 was absent on . administrative duties , the full foam output of 4 ,000 gallons per ffilnute USln¥ �h� ZOX monitor plus Z hand lines could not have been achleved lnltlally. With the present equipment it IS necessary for a foam tender to be fully manned with a crew of at least 4 men to enable it to be operated to its full potential . 
SXT 1 1 1  
The so-c�lled "domestic" tender ,  SXT 111 , was a fully manned foam tender wlth a crew of four men , including a Section Leader. This vehlcle was not used as a foam-producing unit in the initial attack on the flre as the crew had been told that their primary function 
was that of rescue. It is estimated that after their arrival with 
the other north side appliances some 10-16 passengers and crew left 
by the starboard fon,ard cabin door unaided. In the circumstances 
they were not able to be of much assistance in the evacuation . 
SXT 111  was later moved from its origL�al position near the nose 
on the port side to the area of the starboard wing tip and made a 
useful contribution by preventing the fire from extending to the 
starboard wing , which contained some 3 ,000 gallons of fuel. 
In retrospect , it would appear that to have achieved the maximum 
effect it would have been necessary for SXT 111 to have gone into 
action as a foam tender immediately on arrival at the scene of the 
accident. Due to its non-involvement during the initial stages of 
the operation approximately 8 ,000 gallons of foam was not then 
used as a fire suppressant medium. In this particular accident , 
it is doubtful if the decision not to use this appliance as a 
foam-producing unit very soon after arrival at the scene can be 
j ustified. It is important that the maximum volume of fire 
extinguishing medium should be applied to the fire as early as 
possible in the operation. 
VXN 876 
The Cardo� OOz tender , being the �lowest vehicle from the north 
side statlon was the last to arrlve at the scene of the 
accident. The Leading Fireman in command of the appliance placed 
it in a most effective position , to the port side of the nose . . 
After dealing with a fuel spillage flre , he moved the vehlcle In 
towards the port wing root section. He was .h�ered by smo�e and 
poor visibility. The applicat�on of .COZ ' dld , In fact , achleve a 
substantial knockdown of the flre whilst the gas lasted. The 
presence of foam to follow up the ¥ains made by t�e ?Oz could have 
led to an earlier control of the fHe. However , It IS doubtful If 
this action would have resulted in any more lives being saved as , 
by the time that the Cardox unit came into operation , the integrity 
of the fuselage had already been b:eached and the interior of the 
cabin was on fire. The weather belng almost calm was fortunately 
ideal for the application of CO2 , 
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The hose-laying appl iance is a vital link in the fire plan, 
ensuring as it does that a continuous supply of water is available 
from the airport hydrant system. It was most unfortunate that this 
particular unit did not respond immediately to the initial callout 
for the subject accident . The need for the mobile water supply to 
be supplemented from the mains is essential for any extensive air­
craft fire , allowing as it does the continuous appl ication of foam 
whilst the 300 imp gal of foam l iquid carried on the three foam 
tenders and the 300 imp gal on the hose-layer lasts .  
VXN 878 
The rescue tender was parked near the starboard side of the au­
craft nose. There was no call for its special equipment ; however,  
the dry powder extinguishant , breathing apparatus and a ladder were 
used. 
10. 3  Equipment 
10. 3 . 1  SaaZe of equipment and media 
The Board of Trade Southern Divisional Office , as the aerodrome 
l icensing authority , approved the fire fighting facilities avail­
able at Heathrow. The fire fighting facilities provided exceed 
the minimum requirements for the class of aerodrome as defined by 
CAP 168 , with the variation that the provision of 4 ,050 imp gal of 
water to be carried on vehicles , when supported by the hydrant 
system, is accepted by the l icensing authority in l ieu of the 
5 , 280 imp gal appropriate to the aerodrome category. 
The aerodrome l icence requires 4 ,050 imp gal water on wheels and a 
foam discharge rate of 6 ,000 gal/min . With the existing appliances 
available at Heathrow , BAA provide the requisite amount of mobile 
water in three foam tenders and two water tenders . The foam 
discharge rate can, however ,  be met by the output of t\<O foam 
tenders . The l icensing authority has not stipulated how many foam 
tenders must be included in the munber of appliances provided. 
BAA have categorised their third foam tender as the "domestic 
tender" to be used, as its name impl ies , for domestic fires . This 
vehicle normally attends aircraft fires except when it is involved 
in a domestic cal l .  All domestic fires are handed over to the LFB 
as soon as possible , so as to maintain the airport fire strength. 
At the t ime of the subject accident , the designated "domestic 
tender" was SXT 1 1 1 . Excluding this appliance , the amount of 
mobile water was therefore 3 , 250 imp gal . 
No clear instructions have been prepared by BAA as to how the third 
foam tender would provide back-up water supplies for the t�� 
"active" foam tenders . This situation indicates inadequate liaison 
between the BOT Divisional Office and the BAA fire service. 
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��om th� fire �ighting point of view the needs of Heathrow are ose . o a medl':'fll s�zed town. lfuilst the main responsibil ity for handlIng domestlc flres remains as heretofore with the LFB, it is consldered that the unmedlate domestic fire risk should be assessed and catered for separately from the aircraft accident risk. I�eally, alrfleld fire �ppliances should be concerned solely with alrcraft accldents and Incidents. 
In the past, the scale of fire fighting equipment required to be pro�lded at any glven aerodrome has been determined largely by emplT�cal means. W1th the advent of "jumbo" size aircraft, carryIng very large numbers of passengers, some thought should be glven to a more practical approach in the assessment as to what scale of fire equipment is required rather than the present method . 
The development and evolution of the new equipment and techniques 
n�cessary to cope adequately with very large aircraft should be 
vlgorously encouraged. 
10 . 3 . 2  Foam tenders 
The "Nubian" type of foam tender used at Heathrow was introduced 
into service during the summer of 1957 . At that time it was 
considered that the type was able to cope adequately with the size 
of aircraft then operating. The introduction into airline service 
of large jet aircraft posed a much greater problem to airport fire 
services. A solution was found by increasing the number of fire 
appliances available and doubling the output of the monitors . 
However, the bigger size of jet aircraft with fuselage lengths of 
nearly 1 70 feet, coupled with greatly increased fuel loads - for 
example about 20,000 gallons as compared with 7 ,000 gallons, much 
increases the problems presented in an aircraft accident involving 
fire. 
The inherent limitations of existing foam tenders in service, both 
in rate of application and length of throw of foam, when related 
to the increase in aircraft size and fuel capacity, would seem to 
indicate that aircraft development has outstripped the evolution 
of fire fighting appliances. 
The Nubian foam tender cannot generate foam whilst moving. In the 
initial stages of an aircraft fire the ability for the appliance 
to make foam whilst moving is valuable. It must be remembered, 
however that of necessity the amount of water carried on each 
vehicle
'
limits its foam making ability before replenishment . It 
is necessary for a nurse water tender or hydrant hose to be 
connected to the foam tender to ensure a continuous supply of foam. 
Once such connection is made then the appliance is immobile . 
Nevertheless it is considered that all airport fire fighting 
appliances should hav� the ab�lity to produce the appropriate fire 
suppressant medium whllst moVIng . 
New equipment shortly to be introduced into service by BM will go 
a long way to remedy the shortcomings of existing foam tenders. 
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With the introduction of the Boeing 747 type of aircraft , the 
problems are magnified . The fuselage height and fuel capac lty 
for instance are both roughly Uvice that of the Boeing 707 . To 
enable foam , or indeed any other fire fighting medium to be 
projected accurately on to a high structure , cons iderat ion should 
be given to some means of elevat ing the monitor above the normal 
vehicle roof level . 
�lodern foam tenders represent a sizeable capital investment ; the 
l icenslng authority should ensure that a fair balance is achieved 
between the confl icting requirements of operational and fiscal 
policies as far as the provis ion of airport fire equipment is 
concerned . 
10. 3 . 3  Rescue tende� 
The present day concept of a rescue tender is for a l ight vehicle 
with good cross-country capabil ity on which are mounted various 
items of spec ialist equipment : breathing apparatus and 200 lb of 
dry po"der ext inguishing medium. The provis ion of rescue equip­
ment , elaborate or otheruise , is of no value unless manpower is 
available to use it . \vith the l arge increase in aircraft passenger 
loads in the near future , sel f  rescue in the event of an accident 
wil l  be the prime means of saving l ife. There are several roles 
to be played by a rescue tender : (i)  The transport of rescue 
personnel to the accident site ; ( i i) Provis ion of a means of 
access to high wing/fuselage structures , remembering ladders are 
not necessarily the best way of achieving this ; (iii) The 
provis ion of specialist equipment to assist rescue (e . g .  cutting 
tools) ; (iv) Provision of some means whereby passengers can 
reach the ground quickly and safely from high exits , preferably 
flame-resistant ; (v) Water spray or fog equipment for attacking 
aircraft cabin fires . A crit ical re-appraisal should be made of 
the funct ions and design of the rescue tender . 
10 . 3 . 4  Hose-Laying vehicLe 
This appl iance is the vital l ink between the foam tenders and the 
aerodrome hydrant system . It is essential that it attends at an 
aircraft accident early enough to ensure a cont inuous supply of 
water. 
Since the accident, tests have been made at Ilea throw to establ ish 
the facts related to the use of the hose- layer in an aircraft 
accident . 
It was established that water could be provided from a hydrant 
through 1 , 700 feet of twin 31 inch diameter hose at a rate in 
excess of 900 gal /min at lZ 5 ps i .  
The time taken to deploy the hose and for water to reach two foam 
tenders was 4 l  minutes . A foam tender and water tender unit 
provides a total of 1 , 750 imp gal of I.ater , with the appropriate 
quantity of foam l iquid this will produce 1 ,8�8 imp gal of 
solut ion . With a discharge rate of 400 gal/m1TI from each foam 
tender (the planned maximum) both units will be empty in � 
minutes . If a foam/COZ tender replaces .
a foam tender , as was th� 
case in the subject accident then the tune taken to empty the unlt 
would be 4 minutes. 
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To satisfy the r7quirements of the aerodrome licence two foam tenders a:e requ1red to produce solution at a combined rate of 600 gal/m1n. At th1s rate both foam tender units would use up the 3 , 500 1mp gal of water available in 6 minutes. Again,  if a foam/ COZ tender replaces a foam tender in these circumstances then this un1t would be empty after 51 minutes . 
It can be seen therefore that under the test conditions it would have been possible to have maintained the minimum rate of foam 
d1scharge required by the aerodrome licence. However at the 
planned maximum discharge rate there would have been ; margin of 
only 1 5  seconds for a foam tender and an interruption of water 
flow of 30 seconds for a foam/COZ tender . 
The tests were carried out over representative ground under ideal 
conditions and the distance of 1 , 700 feet was considered to be 
representative of the maximum distance that the fire service could 
be expected to operate fTOm a hydrant . Although in many cases the 
nearest hydrant could be appreciably closer than 1 ,700 feet to an 
aircraft accident , it must be appreciated that at night or in 
conditions of poor visibil ity the hose deployment times could be 
adversely affected. 
10 . 3 . 5  HOBe and misaeZZaneous equipment 
The failure of a l ight alloy male hose coupling from the hose-layer 
to mate with a pillar hydrant is considered to have been caused by 
the hydrant and not the coupling. There is no evidence to show 
that l ight alloy couplings , which are used very widely throughout 
the country, are less reliable than the old type heavy metal 
couplings , provided that they are properly maintained. Of the four 
hand foam lines deployed in the initial attack, two burst. 
Examination of BAA records shows that their hose inspection cycles 
are in line with currently accepted standards . 
The BAA fire service have not been able to put fon,ard any 
definite reasons for the failure of the two hoses. There is a 
possibil ity that the burst hose experienced by VXN 863 was caused 
by over-pressurising as a result of poor mon1tor shut down dr1l1 . 
There is no evidence as to the cause of the burst hose deployed by 
SXT 1 1 8 .  By the end of the operation a total of 31 lengths of hose 
had been deployed by the BAA fire service. The failure of the COZ 
hose reel on VXN 863 was apparently due . to faulty a�semblY which 
should have been detectable during rout1ne eXam1nat10n of the 
equipment . 
The monitor operator of VXN 
monitor due to a poor throw. 
Vactrol unit. 
863 stated that he shut down his 
He attributed this to a faulty 
A detailed and critical analysis of all equipment failures should 
be made after an aircraft accident as a matter of course. 
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10.3.6 Hycb'ant system 
The standard of maintenance of the hydrants at Heathrow was poor. 
There also appeared to be differing standards of inspection, 
depending on individual inteIlJretations of what was required. A 
close liaison between the BAA fire service and the engineering 
department is necessary in order that rectification and repair 
work on the hydrants is carried out promptly as and when necessary. 
The presence, for example, of heavy deposits of paints in the bore 
of hydrant outlets where there should be none is inexcusable. 
10. 3. 7 Foam Liquid 
The BOT require 269 imp gal of foam liquid to be immediately 
available at Heathrow to satisfy the terms of the aerodrome 
licence. The BAA provides 670 imp gal of foam liquid carried on 
appliances; 100 imp gal in each of three foam tenders ; 35 imp 
gal in each of tl,O water tenders and 300 imp gal in the hose-layer. 
The combined maximum foam output of the three foam tenders is 
12,000 gal/min which loill exhaust the available supply of foam 
liquid in about 10 minutes. After this time only water will be 
available from the hydrant system. To cover the case of long 
lived and extensive fires some thought should be given to planning 
for the transport of additional foam liquid to the scene of an 
accident. 
10. 3. 8 Breathing apparatuB 
Prior to the accident to "WE" the provision of BA by airport fire 
services was not universal. \fuere it was provided as at Heathrow 
it was with the domestic risk in mind. Analysis of the subject 
accident would seem to higluight a requirement for BA to be 
available at all airports used by large passenger aircraft. The 
equipment should be capable of being brought into use immediately 
on arrival at the scene of an accident. TI,e wearing of the 
standard aerodrome fireman ' s  helmet is incompatible with the use 
of BA .  Although another type of helmet was provided by BAA , it 
would appear desirable that more I,ork should be done on this 
problem. 
10.3.9 CLothing 
The traditional firemrul ' s  uniform has been in use for many years 
and has proved satisfactory. A considerable aroount of work has 
been done on protective clothing for firemen and the development 
of a suitable fire resistant one-piece garment I,hich can easily be 
donned over normal clothing is showing promise. 
10.4 �1anning 
TI,e number of men available on watch at any one time at Heathrow 
is well in excess of the minimum requirements as described in 
CAP 168. The I,atch strength of 21 men , excluding the 3 ambulance 
crew members , provides each fire fighting �ehic1e with a m�imum 
crew complement to enable it to carry out Its prImary functlOns. 
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The rescue tender ? which is primarily a spec ial ist equipment carr1er , was prov1ded w1th � dr1ver in addition to the Duty Stat ion Ofhce r . . Out of . normal . offlce hours the Duty Officer would be the sen10r f1re se�lce off1cer present at the first attendance . In an a1rcraft acc1dent , if all three foam tenders and the Cardox appl lance were used to produce either foam or CO2 , as appropriate , at then max� rate , then no manpower would be available for rescue co �c1dent w1th the fire being suppressed. The rescue tender dr1ver normally acts as a communicat ions l ink for the senior officer present , \,ith a radio pack set . 
With the exist ing level of manning at Heathrow the withdrawal of 
a single fireman , in this case a foam tender c;ew member to act 
as a duty dri�er , reduced the maximum potential rate of �utput 
from h1S ap�l lance by 25 per cent . \iben hand l ines are deployed , 
the al locatlOn of one man to handle each foam l ine would tend to 
l imit the mobility because of the physical effort required to man­
handle 100 feet of charged 2 i inch diameter hose. 
If the hand line has to be extended , then mobility is further 
reduced . I f  fire fighting tactics require , as a standard practice , 
the deployment of hand line s ,  some thought should be given to 
improving the mobility of the branchmen . With the new equipment 
due to be introduced, it will be possible for a driver and monitor 
operator to apply foam at a high rate . However , hand lines will 
still be required in order to reach areas which are inaccessible 
to the monitor and for mopping up operations . Appliance manning 
levels should therefore still be related to the use of hand l ines . 
I t  is imperative that the maximum amount of fire fight ing effort 
should be brought to bear on an aircraft fire in the shortest 
possible t ime . In the case of large international airport s ,  such 
as Heathrow , where large numbers of people are at risk, the Board 
of Trade , as the l icensing authority, should st ipulate more 
precisely than has hitherto been their custom , the nunber of men 
necessary to man the fire appl iances that are required to be 
available. 
10.  5 Command 
This investigat ion has demonstrated how important it is for the 
senior officer present at an aircraft fire to devote his efforts 
to co-ordination and control of the attack on the f1re ; to do 
this it is essential that he has good communicat ions with all 
the �its under his command and that irrespective of the l icence 
requirements he should be . able to make the maximum use of the 
facil ities available to hlffi at the f1re. 
The invest igation has also highlighted the requirement for a high 
cal ibre of appl iance commander ; this will become even more 
important with the introduct10n of more powerful equipment . 
It was noted that in accordance with the recommendat ions of the 
BOT operations of the fire services at HeathrO\, are normally 
und�r the command of an AFO I I ,  although during office hours the 
OCR:> , who is in charge of Heathrow , or ru:t AFO I ,  may t�e over 
command and add to the senior effort ava1lable . There 1S no formal 
requirement for senior officers to return to duty out of hours . 
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This is done on a voluntary basi s .  In view of the size of the 
commitment , which i s  still growing , it would appear desirable for 
the level of the duty commander to be reviewed . 
From the size of the overall fire service respons ibilities it 
would appear also to be desirable to consider whether it i� 
reasonable to expect the officer in command of the Fire Service 
at I lea throw also to carry out dut ies as Deputy Chief Fire Officer 
of BM. 





of agencies actively involved immediately fol lowing 
an a�rcraft acc 1dent at Heathrow , good communications are vital to 
the rapid response of the emergency services .  
The provision of IllJlti -channel R/T equipment in the BM fire 
service and police vehicles would greatly improve the communicat ions 
between the rescue services . 
A greater degree of integration of the communicat ion networks of 
the various agenc ies involved is very necessary . At the present 
t ime , contact is intermittent and slow, relying as it does on land 
lines and relays through two watchrooms . 
The Selcal fac il ity could provide a valuable link between ATC and 
the BM fire service vehicles . However ,  it would appear that 
revision of the drill for using it is needed . It is obviously 
necessary for a fire officer to have uninterrupted R/T contact 
with his other fire vehicles . 
The existing system of pass ing accident information to both the 
airport fire service and the LFB is time-consuming and ponderous . 
Thought should be given to alerting the LFB at the same time as 
the BM fire service . The use of the crash bellS to alert 
personnel for all callouts is highly undesirable .  The crash alarm 
signal should be quite distinct ive and different to that used to 
signify rout ine and domestic turnouts .  Ideal ly, it should only be 
heard in connect ion with aircraft accidents and ground incidents .  
To enable the BM watchroom attendant to function effic iently, 
some form of automat ic recording equipment is necessary, incorporat­
ing a t ime inject ion facility and covering both telephone and R/T 
inputs .  
Consideration should be given to the evaluation and provision of a 
smal l ,  waterproof ,  personal radio for all Fire Officers , the 
Sect ion Leader in charge of the rescue crew and the crew of the 
hose-layer appl iance. 
10. 7  Tactics and tra ining 
Analysis of a number of accidents over the past few years indicates 
that when an aircraft catches fire it is , initially, primarily a 
fuel fire . A secondary fire then develops in the fuselage which is 
little different from a "domestic" type of fire. Whereas foam in 
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l arge quant �ties is , req�ired to attack the fuel fire , water spray 0: some sun1lar med1um , 1s necessary for suppressing the internal f:re . In the past 1t 1S apparent that maximum attent ion has been g1ven to the fuel fire and not enough to the internal fire . Tact1cs should be evolved so that the fuselage internal fire is attacked at the same time as the fuel fire if possible . Certainly , 
as the savillg of l 1fe 1S of paramount importance then the "two 
pronged" attack, with foam and water , would seem 
'
to be attractive , In the case of "WE" , however , the timing of the arrival of the BAA 
hre appl 1ances from the north side station was such that even if 
water spray had been introduced into the fuselage immediately on 
arr1val , it is considered unl ikely that more l ives would have been 
saved . 
With the need for continuous and extensive fire cover at HeathrOl' , 
it is evident that neither men nor equij:!llent can be al located for 
"hot" fire practices as often as is desirable . There is also a 
lack of a suitable training area near Heathrow . This means , in 
e ffect , that between three-yearly visits to the fire service 
training school , an individual fireman could well not have a fire 
practice involving burning aircraft wreckage . This state of 
affairs is pecul iar to aerodrome fire services , as local authority 
firemen are fighting fires literally every day , whereas an airport 
fireman can serve for years without attending an aircraft accident . 
10. 8  Ambulances 
1 1 .  
1 1 . 1  
1 1 . 2  
1 1 . 3  
Under existing conditions , some 14  two-stretcher ambulances can be 
available within 1 5  minutes of an accident at Heathrow . As air­
craft with passenger capacities in excess of 200 are already using 
the airport with even larger loads in the near future , it would 
appear that
'
a re-assessment of ambulance requirements is overdue . 
The provision of an ambulance service at Heathrow is the 
respons ibility of the GLC. 
Al though at first s ight the manning of , the BAA am
bulances by fully 
trained firemen would seem to be profl 1gate , ill fact , as the 
manning of the ambulances is calculated separately from , the f1re 
service watch strength , there would see� �o , be some ment ill the 
arrangement , as it does allow some flex1b11 1ty ill plannillg . To a 
lesser extent it also keeps personnel up to date w1th the 
constantly ch�ging layout of the airport . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The number of appl iances ,  the �unt of �ire extinguishin� media 
and the staff available to the a1rport f1re se:V1ce were ill 
excess of those required by the terms of the a1rport 1 1cence . 
The first attendance of the airport fire service , from , the sub­
stat ion arrived within 30 second� of the a1rcraft comillg , to 
rest . The appl iances from the maill stat 10n arr1ved two millutes 
later. 
The deployment of BAA fire appl iances , with the except ion of the 
C do unit was poor . There were a number of equ1pment fa11ures 
w�chxreduc�d the rate of foam application substant ially below the 
capacity of the available appl iances . 
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1 1 . 4 The airport fire service was successful in preventing the spread 
of fire to the starboard wing containing 3 ,000 imp gal of fuel . 
1 1 . 5  The attendance by the LFB at the scene of the accident was delayed 
due to poor communications and inadequate l iaison. 
1 1 .  6 The comnunicat ions networks of the various agencies involved in an 
aircraft accident at Heathrow require integrating and rationalising. 
There is an immediate need for the provis ion of mult i-channel R/T 
e<.uipment for the BAA fire service and police . Al so , the provision 
of telephone and radio recording equipment in the BAA fire service 
watch room . 
1 1 . 7  Although all the staff attend the BOT fire service tralnlng school 
more frequently than recommended ,  the BAA fire service require 
more frequent and real istic "hot" fire practices . 
1 1 .  8 Faul ts reported in the water hydrant system at Heathrow should be 
rect ified without delay. 
1 1 . 9  The level of manning of the BAA fire service , although well in 
excess of the l icensing requirements , was below that necessary to 
carry out fire fight ing and rescue dut ies efficiently and 
simultaneously at a major conflagrat ion . 
1 1 . 10 To take ful l advantage of the hydrant system and al low the 
sustained production of foam , plans should be made for the 
transport of additional supplies of foam l iquid to the scene of 
an accident . 
1 1 . 1 1 A broadly based working party,  including members from Home Office 
Fire Service Department , local authorities , BOT and BAA should be 
formed to study mId report on the problems of aircraft fire and 
rescue operat ions . Their terms of reference should include 
l iaison between airport and local authorities , the siting of fire 
stat ions , manning (including comnand structure) , fire and rescue 
equipment , media scales , the training of firemen and the scale of 
ambulance cover . 
Fire and Rescue Service Working Group 
March 1969 
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Appendix A 
PRINCIPAL QlARACIERISTICS OF FIRE APPLIANCES AT HEATHROIi 
AI RPORT 
FOAM lENDERS (SlIT 1l1/SlIT 118) 
1 . 1 .  Chassis 
The Nubian TFA 6x6 is a six wheel chassis with drive 
available on all wheels . For normal road surfaces four 
wheel drive on the rear bogie only is employed . 
1 .  2 .  Engine 
The appliance IS powered by a Rolls Royce 8 cyl inder in 
l ine petrol engine developing 215 bhp at 3 . 750 rev/min . 
1 . 3 .  Fire pump 
A �Ierryweather 5 inch single stage centrifugal punp is 
fitted. The drive of the punp is taken from the transfer 
gearbox . I t  is not possible to drive the punp and the 
road wheel s  at the same time . 
The output of the punp , using the tank water supply, 
ranges from 840 imperial gal lons (imp gal) of water per 
minute (gal/min) at 7 5  psi to 250 gal/min at 200 psi . 
1 . 4 . Tankage 
1 . 4 . 1 .  Water tank 800 imp gaL 
The tank can be filled through two 2 j  inch male 
mstantaneous coupl ings fitted' at the rear of the unit .  
1 . 4 . 1 .  Foam Liquid tank 100 imp gaL 
A hopper is fitted around the filler orifice. This enables 
two five gallon drums of foam l iquid to be emptied into 
the tank simultaneously. 
1 . 5 .  Automatic foam proportioning device 
Foam production on this type of Nubian appliance IS 
achieved by feeding foam l iquid and water in the correct 
ratio into the suction side of the fire punp . The water 
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and foam l iquid solution is then suppl ied under pressure via 
the delivery hose to the foam branchpipe where the mixture 
is aerated to produce fire fighting foam. 
The correct proportioning of water and foam l iquid is 
achieved by the Vactrol unit. This is essentially a 
cyl inder and piston assembly similar to that in a vacuum­
servo braking system. When water passes through the pump 
supply l ine a depression is formed which causes movement of 
the vactrol piston proportionate to water flow and the 
foam l iquid valve is  opened so as to achieve the appropriate 
water/foam l iquid mixture - normally 5 per cent. 
1 . 6 .  Function of appl iance 
1 . 6 . 1 .  Foam production 
The appl iance is provided with a total of seven deliveries , 
three for normal foam delivery , one on each side and one in 
the form of a monitor mounted on the roof of the crew cab. 
The s ide foam del iveries are in lockers adjacent to the 
crew compartment and are fitted with 2!  inch instantaneous 
female coupl ings controlled by valves which can be 
operated either locally or remotely from the driver ' s  
position. The lockers also contain a connected 100 foot 
length of 2i  inch delivery hose and a lOx foam branchpipe. 
A 20x foam branchpipe is  normally fitted to the moniter 
but a water branch can be fitted, if required , for water 
delivery. 
The 20x branchpipe has an output of approximately 
2 ,<XX> gal/min of foam normally operated at 100 psi. 
The lOx branchpipes each are capable of producing 
1 ,<XX> gal/min of foam normally operated at 60 psi .  The 
water carried is sufficient to produce about 8 ,<XX> imp 
gal of foam in about 2 minutes at full delivery. 
1 . 6 . 2 .  Water production 
Two 2!  inch instantaneous water delivery outlets , locally 
controlled by wheel operated valves are provided on 
each s ide of the appliance . If desired, the side foam 
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deliveries and the monitor can also be used as water 
del iveries , or vice versa . 
1 . 6 . 3 .  Hose �eeZ 
A hose reel with 180 feet of i inch rubber hose and 
equipped 'vith an adjustable jet/spray branchpipe , 
supplied from the fire pump , is mounted at the rear 
of the appliance . This hose is available for use 
whenever the pump is operating . \�len the foam regulator 
is selected "on" a mixture of foam l iquid and water 1S 
del ivered through the hose reel .  
2 .  WATER TENDERS (sxr 119/Sxr 120) 
These appliances are mechanically similar to the fown 
tender. The major differences are itemised below. 
2 . 1 .  Tankage 
2 . 1 . 1 .  Water tank 950 imp gal 
2 . 1 . 2 .  Foam l iquid tank 35 imp gal 
2 . 2 .  Funct ion of appliance 
2 . 2 . 1 .  Foam p�oduction 
The primary function of a water tender is to supply water 
to a foam tender . However , it is capable of producing 
foam and is equipped with two foam branches which can if 
necessary be used from any of the six available delivery 
outlets .  The water carried is sufficient to produce about 
9 ,000 imp gal of foam, but with its available foam l iquid 
it can produce approximately 7 ,000 imp gal of foam. 
2 . 2 . 2 .  Wate� p�oduction 
Two 2}  inch instantaneous delivery outlets are provided 
on each side of the appliance for use as water deliver
ies . 
If  desired, the two foam delivery outlets can also
 be 




TENDER (VXN 863) 
This appliance is mechanically similar to the foam tenders . 
The major differences are itemised belOlI . 
3 .  1 .  Tankage 
3 . 1 . 1 .  Water tank 550 imp gal 
3 . 1 . 2 .  Foam l iquid tank 100 imp gal 
3 . 2 .  CO2 installat ion 
Eight SO lb CO2 cyl inders with a hose reel containing 
100 feet of j inch HP del ivery hose, a 200 lb per 
minute appl icator and a wing piercer . 
The gas is discharged into a manifold system which in 
turn feeds into a del ivery pipe , fitted with a master 
control valve , leading to the hose reel . 
4 . RESCUE TENDER 
4 . 1 .  Chassis 
The chassis 1S a Bedford "R" type with drive on all 
four "heels . An al ternator for the rescue saw is 
prov ided , dr iven by a po"er take-off (pto) from the 
transmiss ion train . 
4 . 2 .  Engine 
The appliance 1S powered by a Bedford 6 cylinder petrol 
eng1ne . 
of about 
4 . 3 .  Bodyllork 
In top gear 
65 mph . 
this represents a maximum road speed 
Seats and lap straps are provided for four crew members , 
in addition to the driver. 
4 . 4  . Rescue sail 
An al ternator driven from the power take-off provides 
electrical power exclusively to a 1 2  inch rescue saw. 
I t  is provided with a 200 feet cable reel o f  heavy duty 
insula ted wire . 
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4 . 5 .  Anc i l lary l ight ing 
4 . 5 . 1 .  1'\'0 1 5  inch floodl ights are mounted on the appliance roof.  
A standard 9 inch portable searchl ight , complete IJith 
tripod and 100 feet of cable is also carried , and an "S" 
type portable searchlamp lIith battery box and accessories . 
4 . 6 .  Dry pOl,er installation 
The appl iance is equipped \Ji th a 200 Ib dry pol.der 
installation, discharging through t"o 60 foot lengths of 
i inch diameter reinforced rubber hose.  Each l ine IS 
contro l l ed  by an isolat ion valve and terminates in a 
pistol grip flat fan nozzle.  At normal \lorking pressure 
there should be an effective powder thro" of 20 fee t .  The 
discharge t ime "ith both nozzles operating continuously is 
about 60 second s .  
4 . 7 .  Stretcher ladder 
The ladder , made of a luminium al loy, can be used as a 
stretcher or a l adder . It is made in single units 7 feet 
8 inches in length. Up to four units can be joined 
together to make a longer ladder . 
4 . 8 .  Ladder 
A 1 5  foot aluminium al loy ladder , IS carried on the 
appl iance roof.  
4 . 9 .  Lifting and forcing equipment 
This equipment consists of a hand operated hydraulic pump 
fitted with 6 feet of high pressure flexible hose which 
can be connected to (a) a wedgie j ack with a jaw spread of 
three inches , Cb) a 6 ton ram, or Cc) an 8 ton ram . There 
d (fl ed e and ''V'' type) ', base are a range of hea s a t ,  w g 
plates and extension tubes of varying lengths up to three 
feet long . 
4 . 10 .  Resuscitation apparatus 
One resuscitation set is carried on this appliance . 
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4 . 11 .  Breathing apparatus 
1'\.0 self-contained sets of breathing apparatus (BA) are 
carried on the appl iance . 
5 .  CAROOX 002 APPLIANCE 
This appliance has the same Thorneycroft chassis as the foam 
tenders . Its sole func t ion is to carry a large quant ity of 
CO2 "hich can be readily discharged at a fire . I t  can 
del iver CO2 "hilst moV1ng . Accommodation is provided for 
a cre" of tHO . 
5 . 1 .  CO2 tank 6 ,000 lb 
The CO2 is retained in liquid form by an electrical 
refrigerat ion system and is kept under pressure in an 
insulated container. 
5 . 2 .  CO2 production 
The appliance is provided with a boom discharge applicator 
mounted on top of the appl iance . This can be traversed , 
elevated and depressed by the crew ; it is capable of 
discharging about 2 , 500 lb of CO2 per minute in gaseous 
form. In addit ion D'O side 002 del iveries are provided , 
each capable of producing 750 lb of 002 per minute . 
\Vith the boom applicator producing gas cont inuously the 
endurance of the appliance is approximately 21  minutes . 
6 .  HOSE LAYER APPLIANCE 
The chassis is a standard Bedford 4 x 4 s imilar to that 
used on the rescue tender .  Accommodation is provided 
for a c rew of two . 
6 . 1 .  lIose storage 
Storage is provided for 4 ,000 feet of 3!  inch light weight 
rubber-l ined hose in 100 foot lengths complete with 
21  inch instantaneous l ight al loy couplings . The hose is 
sto"ed coupled up in 2 ,000 feet l ines in each of two side 
lockers . 
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It i s  possible to lay the hose out automatically from the 
rear of the vehicle IIhilst trave l l ing at mph 
either as a s ingle l ine or two l ines s imul taneousl y .  
6 . 2 .  Foam l iquid 300 imp gal 
Foam l iquid can be pumped at a rate of 40 gal/min through 
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Q? Monitor VXN 863 shut down 
- Offsode hose VXN 863 burst 
SXT 118 producing foam 
4 VXN 863 hose replaced 
5 SXTtt8 offside hose burst 
6 SXT 118 hose replaced 
7 VXN 863jsXT 120 out of wot.r 
® SXT 118/119 out of water 
9 Hydrant water to VXN 863 
.. " to SXT 118 
Cardox CO2 into action 
" empty 
Hydrant ·supply connected 
NOTE: (i) Solid line represents potential 
fOi>m capacity available 
(Ii) Dotted hne represents foam 
capacIty used 
(Ill) Zero minutes represents 
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Appendix E 
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TIlE REPORT 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
BM British Airports Authority 
BoT Board of Trade 
Branchpipe No . lOx type - A hand held l ight alloy branchpipe 
designed to operate at a pressure of 60 psi 
at the \later head and provides foam by self­
asperation of air . At this pressure the 
consumption of Hater and foam l iquid is 95 and 
5 gal/min respectively, producing 1 ,000 gal/min 
of foam . 
No . 20x type - This is similar in design and 
construct ion to the lOx type . It is designed to 
be used at a pressure of 100 psi at the \later 
head and at this pressure the consumption of 
Hater and foam l iquid is 190 and 10 gal/min 
respectively, producing approximately 
2 , 000 gal/min of foam . 
Foam l iquid Protein based substance manufactured from 
either vegetable or animal protein and used 
in solution "ith "ater to produce mechanical 
foam. 
gal/min Imperial gallons per minute . 
Hand l ine Any hand held discharge l ine - e . g .  Hater , 
foam CO2 
or dry po\Jder terminating in a branch-
pipe or applicator . 
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Vactrol 
70 
Imperial gal lons . 
London Fire Brigade. 
London Ambulance Serv ice . 
A foam or ,mter outlet with a branchpipe 
connected to a fire appliance plumbing 
system. Monitors are usually located on the 
crew cab roof or appl iance superstructure . 
Normal ly manual operation is employed and many 
instal lat ions are capable of 3600 traverse 
with some elevat ion and depression . 
Pounds per square inch pressure . 
Automatic device for supplying a foam branch­
pipe with water and foam l iquid in the 
correct proportions . 
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